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L Introduction
Is an emissions trading program an economic incentive program? Emis-
sions trading programs allow polluters to avoid pollution reductions at a
regulated pollution source, if they provide an equivalent reduction elsewhere.2
Most scholars, government officials, andpractitioners equate emissions trading
with economic incentives, but they do not define "economic incentives."
This failure to define economic incentives leaves unsupported the sugges-
tion that emissions trading realizes environmental goals through economic
incentives, but that traditional regulations (rules that limit discharges of
pollutants into the environment without allowing trading) do not. Both tradi-
tional regulation and emissions trading rely upon the threat of a monetary
penalty to secure compliance with government commands setting emission
limitations.' Perhaps neither traditional regulation nor emissions trading
should be considered economic incentive programs, because both rely upon
government commands.4 Or perhaps both should be considered economic
incentive programs, because monetary penalties provide a crucial economic
incentive in both systems.
Rather than define economic incentives, scholars employ a conventional
dichotomy that contrasts "command and control" regulations (rules that dictate
1. See J.H. DALES, POLLUTION PROPERTY AND PRICES 92-100 (1968).
2. See infra p. 325 (discussing emissions trading programs). Polluters can provide
reductions either by making them at another pollution source they control or through purchase
from another facility that has made "additional" reductions.
3. See infra pp. 323 & 333.
4. See Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 549,
565-66 (1996) (noting that traditional standards constitute most significant "market force" in
environmental protection).
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precisely how a polluter must clean-up) with economic incentives.' They
claim that command and control regulations work inefficiently, discourage
innovation, and fail to provide continuous incentives to reduce pollution; but
that emissions trading and other economic incentive programs overcome these
problems.'
The dichotomy between command and control regulations and economic
incentives has had a powerful influence upon policy.' On October 22, 1997,
President Clinton outlined his plans to address global climate change, an
increase in global mean surface temperatures that emissions of carbon dioxide
and other "greenhouse gases" cause.8 The President's speech stressed the
issue's importance by referring to some possible consequences of climate
change including "disruptive weather events" (such as droughts and floods),
the spread of "disease bearing insects," and receding glaciers (which might
cause inundation of coastal areas).9 President Clinton did not mention a single
new traditional regulatory program or propose any specific cuts in greenhouse
gas emissions, such as carbon dioxide, below 1990 levels to combat this
potential menace. Instead, he announced a "package of strong market incen-
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thor-
oughbred Hobbled?, 13 CoLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 217,218-19 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
L. Hester, Where DidAll the Markets Go? An Analysis ofEPA 's Emissions Trading Program,
6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109-10 (1989); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 (1991);
Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13
CoLUM.J.ENvTL.L. 153,153-54(1988) [hereinafter Stewart, Risks]; Richard B. Stewart, United
States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585-87 (1996);
see also Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the
Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia and Inconsistency, 45 EMORYL.J. 1329, 1336 (1996).
6. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, ReformingEnvironmentalLaw: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 171, 171-72 (1988); Dudek
& Palmisano, supra note 5, at 219-23; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 5-15.
7. See Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,668,
39,668-70 (1995) (proposed Aug. 3, 1995) (expressing EPA's "strong support" for emissions
trading in light of President Clinton and Vice President Gore's decision to make emissions
trading program number one initiative for regulatory "reinvention" at EPA).
8. Remarks at the National Geographic Society, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1629
(Oct. 22, 1997) (President William J. Clinton).
9. Id. at 2. President Clinton stated that "glacial formations are receding." Id Scientists
have predicted that the glaciers will recede because a changing climate melts them to some
degree. See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (J.T. Houghton et
al. eds., 1996). This melting could cause rises in sea levels that could flood low lying coastal
areas. Id at 359-406. Climate change could also spread infectious diseases, such as malaria.
See SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN
ASSESSMENToFVULNERABILITY5 (RobertT. Watson et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter SUMMARY].
Malaria has, in fact, become more common and widespread in recent years. See Ellen Ruppel
Shell, Resurgence of a Deadly Disease, ATL. MONTHLY, Aug. 1997, at 45.
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tives, tax cuts and cooperative efforts with industry."' ° The President's
package included emissions trading, which is the "economic incentive pro-
gram" most often implemented. His proposal would allow polluters in one
country to avoid greenhouse gas reductions at home in exchange for pollution
reductions abroad. " Not surprisingly, emissions trading became an important
element of the subsequently negotiated Kyoto Protocol on climate change, in
which the developed countries apparently agreed to modest cuts in greenhouse
gas emissions.1
2
A few days prior to Clinton's speech on climate change, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) released its proposal to address interstate pollu-
tion, an important impediment to delivering healthful air under the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act.'3 The EPA, predictably, called for an
interstate emissions trading program.
4
10. See SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 4. Subsequently, negotiators accepted modest cuts
in greenhouse gases below 1990 levels. See William K. Stevens, Tentative Accord is Reached
to Cut Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1997, at Al. The emissions trading proposal
proved very controversial at Kyoto. Id.
11. See Establishing an International System for TradingPollution Rights, 15 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 80, 80 (Feb. 12, 1992); Jeffrey C. Fort & Cynthia A. Faur, Can Emissions Trading
Work Beyond a National Program?: Some Practical Observations on the Available Tools, 18
U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 463, 463-64 (1997). Although President Clinton referred to his
proposal as an emissions trading proposal, the United States has actually supported conceptually
similar, but more amorphous, environmental benefit trading. This would allow credits for
conserving rainforests, which sequester carbon dioxide, to justify failing to reduce emissions.
See Kyoto Protocol to the United National Climate Change Convention, Dec. 10, 1997, art. 6,
§ 1, reprinted in 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1596 (Dec. 12, 1997); Lbst-Minute Move by US. Led
to Pact, Some Delegates to Negotiations Assert, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1567, 1567 (Dec. 12,
1997) [hereinafter Last-Minute Move] (reporting that "joint implementation" and greenhouse
gas "sinks," both United States ideas that are closely linked to emissions trading, were retained
in final text).
12. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Climate Change Convention, Dec. 10,
1997, art. 3, §§ 1, 3-4, 10-13, art. 4, § 1, art. 6, §§ 1-4, reprinted in 28 Env'tRep. (BNA)1596,
1596-1605 (Dec. 12, 1997); Negotiators inJapanReachAgreementfor 6 Percent Emission Cut
by 2008-2012, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1565, 1565 (Dec. 12, 1997); Last-Minute Move, supra
note 11, at 1567; Kyoto MeetingEnds WithAgreement, LeavingDetailsfor 1998 in BuenosAires,
28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1567, 1567 (Dec. 12, 1997). Because the emissions trading provisions
cited above leave open the possibility that developed countries may fund forestry projects
abroad in lieu of emission reductions, a theoretical possibility exists that no actual emission
reductions will take place. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Climate Change Conven-
tion, Dec. 10, 1997, art. 6, § 1, reprinted in 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1596 (Dec. 12, 1997) (refer-
ring to use of "emission reduction" credits for "enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks").
13. See Implementation of Ozone, PM Standards to Dominate EPA AirAgenda in 1998,
28 Env't Rep. (BNA) S-7, S-8 (Jan. 16, 1998).
14. Although the northeastern States have sued EPA to force a more vigorous response
to the interstate pollution issue, both the States and EPA agree that emissions trading should be
a means of addressing the issue. See States, EPA Still Differ on Plan to Cut Ozone; Negotia-
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This Article develops a theory of economic incentives. Any program to
regulate orto deregulate creates economic incentives. 5 The programs referred
to as "economic incentive" programs all envision a substantial governmental
role of some kind. That is why lawyers, experts in law, write about them. 6
Moreover, traditional environmental law creates free markets. Law
performs a fundamental role in creating markets generally, 7 and environmen-
tal law is no different. For example, laws requiring businesses to keep prom-
ises to customers and suppliers (contract) make commercial transactions
possible.' Laws allowing owners to forbid nonowners from using "their"
property create a need for nonowners to buy or rent property from owners.' 9
Traditional environmental law creates markets, just as surely as contract and
property law create markets.2" It establishes obligations that cause a polluter
to hire people (or pay contractors) to clean-up dirty facilities.2 ' This creates
markets in pollution control technology, techniques, and cleaner processes,
just as obligations to fulfill contractual promises and refrain from appropriat-
ing private property create markets in goods consumers wish to have.
Any meaningful theory of economic incentives must address several key
questions. What precisely does a proposed program provide incentives to do?
Who will create the incentives? A theory that focuses on these questions
helps analyze claims that emissions trading offers free market-like dynamic
advantages - inducement of innovation and continuous environmental im-
provement - central to its attractiveness.' It clarifies the advantages and
tions Will Continue Over Next Month, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1244, 1244 (Oct. 24, 1997); EPA
Proposal Calls on 22 States to Cut NOx Emissions by 1.6Million Tons Per Year, 66 U.S.L.W.
2250, 2250-51 (Oct. 28, 1997).
15. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Versus Political Environmen-
talism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297,302 (1992).
16. See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 325, 332-33 (1992) (stating that even system based entirely on property rights requires
governmental role).
17. See RobertE. Hudec, Differences in NationalEnvironmentalStandards: The Level-
Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 8 (1996).
18. See IJOsEPHM.PERLLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1(4th ed. 1993).
19. See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle ofRights"Picture ofProperty, 43 UCLAL. REv. 711,
814-15 (1996); cf Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure ofMarkets: The Role of Contract
and Property Law, 73 B.U.L. REV. 389, 392 & n.13 (1993).
20. See Hays, supra note 4, at 565-66.
21. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 24 ECOLOGYL.Q. 545,573-74(1997) (noting that regula-
tory requirements can force polluters to hire personnel).
22. This article will focus on the claims ofeconomic incentive proponents and, therefore,
the values they seek to promote. This focus does not diminish other perspectives or values. For
example, some object to use of economic incentives because they believe that pollution should
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disadvantages of traditional regulation. It shows that much more useful things
can be done with the concept of economic incentives than trade emission
reduction obligations. A theory of economic incentives may help create more
dynamic and effective environmental law.
Part II of this Article reviews the conventional critique of traditional
regulation that motivates calls to adopt economic incentives.' It shows that
the command and control epithet does not properly apply to most traditional
environmental regulation and provides a more balanced description of tradi-
tional regulation's advantages and disadvantages.24 It then explains that the
history of emissions trading raises some questions about using emissions
trading to remedy traditional regulation's defects.' Ironically, the conven-
tional dichotomy may encourage application of emissions trading where it will
not function well.26 Where emissions trading can provide benefits, the dichot-
omy may hinder efforts to design programs properly.
Part III questions the assumption that a sharp dichotomy divides, eco-
nomic incentives from command and control regulation.' It compares emis-
sions trading's economic dynamics to those of traditional regulation.2"
Emissions trading does not rely more heavily upon economic incentives to
reduce emissions than traditional regulation does.2 9 Emissions trading does
not provide incentives for continuous environmental improvement and may
spur less emission reducing innovation, even in theory, than comparable
traditional regulation.'
Part IV develops a true economic incentives theory to describe the
requisites for programs that will actually induce more innovation and continu-
bear a stigma. See generally STEVEKELMAN, WHATPRICE INCENTIVES: ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1981).
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part III.
30. Technological change involves securing diffusion of existing techniques and the
invention of new techniques. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal
Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REv. 771,772-73 (1977); Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, andAdministrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV.
1259, 1282-83 (1981). For the purpose of this Article, innovation is defined according to its
conventional meaning, i.e. to involve invention of something new (or at least use of something
not yet well understood). Sophisticated critics generally recognize that command and control
regulation promotes diffusion of technology, but still criticize it for discouraging innovation.
See Louis G. TORNATzKY & MITCHELL FLEISCHER, THE PROCESSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION 9-25 (1990); Stewart, supra, at 1282-83.
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ous improvement than traditional regulation or emissions trading." Pollution
taxes may provide continuous incentives for innovation in theory, but taxes
rely upon government decision making as the stimulant for reductions. 2
Making economic competition to reduce pollution the source of economic
incentives, rather than the magnitude of politically-determined fees may do
more to stimulate innovation and continuous improvement.33 Emissions
trading has limited utility, because it makes little use of economic incentives,
suffers from many of the impediments that frustrate the traditional regulatory
system, and creates new enforcement and design difficulties.34
We should replace the command and control/economic incentive dichot-
omy with a more nuanced analytical approach to both traditional regulation
and economic incentive programs. Quasi-religious faith in programs labeled
economic incentives and demonization of traditional regulation will not
suffice.
IL The Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy
This Part evaluates the conventional critique of traditional regulation as
command and control regulation.35 An account of the claims made for emis-
sions trading and some of its history follow.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. This Part focuses on the arguments most central to the conventional critique and to
a theory of economic incentives, but other criticisms have also maligned traditional regulation.
For example, Professors Stewart and Ackerman argue that a "Best Available Technology"
(BAT) strategy is inconsistent with intelligent priority setting. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 6, at 174-75. BAT strategy (or emissions trading), however, can be employed to achieve
either well or poorly chosen priorities.
Many environmental statutes do not use BAT to establish priorities, but as a strategy to
meet priorities established in other ways. For example, under the Clean Air Act, Congress,
EPA, and the states prioritize when they choose which pollutants to regulate and which
pollution sources to regulate first. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b), (c), (e) (1994).
Professors Stewart and Ackerman's argument aimed at "prioritizing" resembles an
argument for weakening environmental protection. They argue against "regulating to the hilt
whatever pollutants or problems happen to get on the regulatory agenda." Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 6, at 174-75. They may be suggesting that we ought not to pursue chosen priorities
vigorously, or that we need to leave more items off of the regulatory agenda. In any case, BAT
statutory provisions do not require regulation "to the hilt." Id. at 172. They only require
limitations reflecting what available technology can achieve and, as actually implemented, often
demand less than that. Id.
Because we lack a clear definition of prioritizing, it is difficult to separate arguments for
weakened or less extensive regulation from arguments about prioritizing. The whole issue of
prioritizing requires more extended treatment than this Article can provide.
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A. Traditional Regulation: Commanding and Controlling?
Below, several conventional criticisms of traditional regulation are
examined. First, critics claim that traditional regulation is excessively rigid
and consequently discourages innovation.36 Second, critics argue that tradi-
tional regulation provides no incentive for continuous environmental improve-
ment.37 Third, critics argue that the process of establishing technology-based
regulations involves inordinate complexity and delay." Fourth, critics state
that uniform standards are inefficient.39 These criticisms contain some truths,
but they also include distortions that unfairly disparage traditional regulation
and misinform discussion of economic incentives.
1. The Rigidity Critique: The Myth of Pervasive
"Command and Control" Regulation
Proponents of economic incentives advance a rigidity critique of tradi-
tional regulation. The rigidity critique holds that command and control regu-
lation generates unnecessarily high compliance costs because the regulator,
36. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 5, at 220; Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at 109
(stating that "'command and control' regulations... specify the methods and technologies
[that] firms must use to control pollution"); see also Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 158.
Professor Stewart, offering an additional critique, states that "centralized regulation" tends to
discourage innovation because of a reluctance to shut down old plants and a willingness to
impose disproportionate burdens on "new pollutants." Id.
The problem identified by Professor Stewart can exist or can be eliminated whether one
employs "centralized" regulation, "decentralized" regulation, or emissions trading. Id. As
Professor Stewart recognizes, some existing environmental statutes, even those that authorize
decentralized permitting, reflect a policy decision to impose stricter requirements on new
sources than on existing sources of pollution because designing new equipment with pollution
control in mind often costs less then retrofitting existing plants. See Stewart, supra note 30, at
1270-71. One can reject or accept this policy choice with or without centralized regulation. A
decision to adopt emissions trading still leaves open choices about whether to adopt differential
treatment of new and existing pollution sources. Indeed, Professor Stewart notes that "[t]he
possibility of 'grandfathering' existing sources enhances... [emissions trading's] political
acceptability." Id. at 1337. If permits are auctioned, as Professor Stewart recommends, then
permits may be scarce and expensive (or even unavailable) for new plants. If they are not
auctioned, then the program designer must decide how initially to allocate emission allowances,
just as in "centralized regulation." Political forces will tend to favor allocations favoring
existing sources. See Developing a Market in Emissions Credits Incrementally: An "Open
Market"Paradigmfor Market-BasedPollution Control, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1522, 1525 (Dec.
2, 1994) (explaining that "closed market system," like acid rain control program, raises barriers
to newer, cleaner competitors by giving pollution rights to existing sources).
37. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1326 (statingthat"command and control regulation...
provide[s] no incentive for superior performance").
38. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 6, at 174; Stewart, supra note 30, at 1273-77.
39. See Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 158.
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instead of deciding only how much pollution reduction to demand, also
specifies the technologies and methods firms must use to control pollution.40
This may prove inefficient because the polluter knows its facility better than
the regulator and can determine howto deliver any given decrease in pollution
more efficiently than the regulator.41 Hence, command and control regulation
involves unnecessary expense and discourages innovation because the wrong
decision maker decides how to reduce emissions.
Analyzing the degree of rigidity requires some understanding of existing
environmental law. When the government establishes rules governing pollu-
tion sources it must make decisions about both a standard's stringency (e.g.,
the amount of allowable pollution) and its form. These two determinations
are conceptually distinct.42
The degree of freedom that a regulation gives an operator to innovate to
meet a standard depends upon decisions about its form - a question of regula-
tory technique. These decisions may be independent of decisions regarding
the stringency of a standard.43 The term "command and control" regulation
describes a certain form of a regulation. The term connotes a regulation that
specifies a precise compliance method rather than simply an emissions level."
Environmental law, however, does not require true command and control
regulation, except in very limited circumstances. Environmental statutes
specifically encourage performance standards4" - a form of a standard that
specifies a level of environmental performance,46 rather than the use of a
40. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at 109 (stating that "'command and control'
regulations... specify the methods and technologies that firms must use to control pollution");
see also Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 5, at 220.
41. See RICHARD A. LiRoFF, REFORMiNG AiR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND
TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE 4 (1986).
42. See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Positive Political Economy of Instrument
Choice in Environment Policy 3 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describ-
ing choice to pursue emissions trading as "choice among the instruments" and decision about
pollution levels as separable issue).
43. Id
44. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1264, 1326 (identifying "prescription of the precise
conduct required of each person subject to regulation" as adistinguishing feature of"command-
and-control regulation"). Scholarly definitions of command and control regulation vary. See
Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 5 (defining command and control regulation to include both
commands to use particular pollution controls and performance standards). The prescription of
conduct definition enjoys widespread use and certainly captures what the words "command-and-
control" connote. The connotation of the words may be more important than the precise (but
varying) definitions inscholarlyjournals, becausethetermhas becomepartofpolitical discourse.
45. See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 845 (1984).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d 1153, 1157 (5th Cir. 1985). The
technology-based standards for air emissions from new automobiles are also performance
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particular technique." Performance standards encourage innovation by
allowing polluters to choose how to comply.4"
Many statutory provisions severely restrict EPA's authority to specify
mandatory compliance methods.49 Several provisions require a performance
standard unless EPA finds that one cannot measure emissions directly to
determine compliance." Even when the statutes permit work practice stan-
dards or other types of standards that do command specific control tech-
niques," the statutes often require EPA to approve adequately demonstrated
standards. They dictate a precise limitation, not a precise method for achieving the limitation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(g) (1994).
The technology-based regulations that states with dirty air must promulgate may also be
performance standards. The Clean Air Act requires state plans to "provide for the implementa-
tion of all reasonably available control measures," but not through "command and control"
mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (1994). Rather, it requires "reductions in emissions from
existing sources.., as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably
available control technology." Id. EPA and the courts have interpreted this statutory language
as authorizing promulgation of numerical emission limitations that do not dictate the precise
compliance method. See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1986).
47. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 5-6 ("A performance standard typically identifies
a specific goal.., and gives firms some latitude in meeting this target. These standards do not
specify the means, and therefore, provide greater flexibility.. .. "); Stewart, supra note 30, at
1268 ("Performance standards allow regulated firms flexibility to select the least costly or least
burdensome means of achieving compliance."); cf Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 158 ("Regu-
latory commands dictate specific behavior by each plant, facility, or product manufacturer.").
48. TORNATSZY &FLEISCHBER, supra note 30, at 101.
49. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating
that EPA may not limit use of ethanol in reformulated gasoline because Clean Air Act mandates
performance standards); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that authority to set performance standards does not include authority to specify fuels).
50. For example, Section 112(d) of the Clean Air Act requires that EPA set "emission
standards" for hazardous air pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994). These standards
require the maximum degree of reductions achievable taking various considerations into account
(including cost). Id. In determining what is achievable EPA may consider a list of techniques
available to a polluter "including, but not limited to... process changes," material substitution,
enclosure of systems, or end-of-pipe controls. Id. But if the administrator wishes to use a
design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, which really does command and
control specific techniques, she must find that it is not practical to prescribe or enforce an
emissions standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)(D), (h)(1)-(2), (h)(4) (1994).
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires a "standard of performance," which "means a
standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects" (not commands) the application of best
available technology. See 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(1), (b) (1994). Section 111, like Section 112,
only authorizes design, equipment, work practice or operational standards, when a "standard of
performance" cannot be designed or enforced. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(h)(1) (1994).
51. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275,287,294-95 (1978) (discus-
sing work practice standard for asbestos). Congress subsequently overruled Adamo's holding
that EPA cannot enforce a work practice standard in a criminal proceeding. See United States
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alternatives.52 True command and control regulations are the exception rather
than the rule.53
The traditional critique states that all technology-based standards involve
agency decisions specifying compliance mechanisms.O This critique confuses
criteria for making stringency determinations with decisions about the form
of standards. Statutory provisions requiring technology-based standards
instruct implementing agencies to set standards that are achievable with either
existing or, in some cases, future technology. 5 Hence, agency views concern-
ing the capability of technology help determine the stringency of the stand-
ard.
56
The pointthat environmental law generally favors performance standards
rather than command and control regulation applies fully to technology-based
standards. Pollution sources may generally use any adequate technology they
choose to comply with the performance standards that an agency has devel-
oped through the evaluation of a reference technology. 7
v. Ethyl Corp., 576 F. Supp. 80, 82 (M.D. La. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 1153
(5th Cir. 1985). The Clean Air Act still distinguishes work practice standards from emissions
levels in regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h), 7412(h) (1994).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 741 1(h)(3); 7412(h)(3) (1994).
53. See Hays, supra note 4, at 564; Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Techno-
logical Innovation, and Technology-Forcing, 10 NAT. RESOURCEs & ENV'T 64, 65 (1995)
("The automobile emission standards are typical in that they specify performance but not tech-
nology."); Keohane et al., supra note 42, at 1 (noting that performance standards are more
common than "design standards" that require specific technologies); see also Nicholas A.
Ashford et al., UsingRegulation To Change the Marketfor Innovation, 9 HARV.ENvTL.L.REv.
419,425 (1985) (noting that "detailed specification" standards may prompt rapid diffusion of
state-of-the-art technology, even though they discourage innovation).
54. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 5, at 220; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 5
("Technology-based standards identify particular equipment that must be used to comply with
a regulation").
55. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 180
(6th Cir. 1986); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 628-29 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
56. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 360-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Statutory
provisions usually allow EPA to take cost and some other factors into consideration. See, e.g.,
id. at 319-36. The courts may reverse EPA if its view about the level technology can achieve
is arbitrary and capricious. See id. (upholding standard as achievable and consistent with
statute); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (remanding to collect
additional data because record had inadequate support with respect to "achievability" of
performance standards).
57. See supra notes 45, 49-51, 55-56 (providing examples under Clean Air Act). The
Clean Water Act's technology-based standards (such as the Best Available Technology (BAT)
standards) also require performance standards that a polluter may satisfy through her own
choice of techniques. For example, Section 304(b)(1)(A) of the Act requires EPA to "identify,
in terms of amounts... the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of
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Professor Ackerman's detailed study of a particularly controversial New
Source Performance Standard (NSPS) under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments may have indirectly contributed to this characterization of technology-
based standards as command and control regulation. However, one should
not base the characterization of an entire body of regulation on one solitary
example. The 1977 NSPS reflected strong Congressional pressure, illustrated
by statutory language and legislative history aimed squarely at this one
regulation, to avoid writing standards encouraging massive fuel switching that
might threaten coal miners' jobs. 9 Even this unusually constrained NSPS
allowed utilities to meet their emission limitations through innovative means,
although it precluded complete reliance upon techniques that could not meet
the emission limitations." Hence, identification of rigidity with technology-
the best practicable control technology." See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis
added). Similarly, Section 304(b)(2)(A) requires a quantitative limit using almost identical
language. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) (1994). The actual BAT regulations and other
technology-based standards under the Clean Water Act generally require that the operator meet
a quantitative limit, and the standards do not forbid the use of technologies different from those
the agency considered when writing the regulation. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont deNemours v. Train,
430 U.S. 112, 122 & n.9 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 787 F.2d 965,972 (5th Cir.
1986); Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1980); American
Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1045 (3d Cir. 1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977).
58. Compare Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 5 (citing mandates to install flue gas
scrubbers to illustrate claim that "technology-based standards identify particular equipment that
must be used to comply with the regulation"), with BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLLAM T.
HASSLER, CLEANCOAL/DIRTYAIR, 15-21 (1981) (discussingNSPS that allegedly mandated flue
gas scrubbing), andBruceA. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and
the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1481-88 (1980) (same).
59. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 58, at 1494-95, 1504-05, 1508-11. Professors
Ackerman and Hassler argue that the special legislative materials directed at this particular
NSPS did notrequire forced scrubbing and urged ajudicial remand on that ground. Id. at 1559.
The D.C. Circuit upheld the standards as consistent with these same legislative materials. See
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 318; see also Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real RegulatoryEfficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1267, 1284-88 (1985) (criticizing Ackerman and Hassler's failure to consider Congressio-
nal goals for this particular regulation).
60. This NSPS limited sulfur dioxide emissions to 1.2 pounds (Ibs.) per Million British
Thermal Units (MBtu). Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 312. It also required a ninety percent
reduction from uncontrolled levels except for plants emitting less than 0.6 lbs./MBtu. Id These
cleaner plants needed only to meet a seventy percent reduction requirement. Id Nothing in the
regulation specifically required any particular technology, such as wet scrubbing. Indeed, the
regulation was specifically designed to leave open opportunities for plants to meet the standards
through dry scrubbing and other alternatives that were regarded as somewhat experimental. Id.
at 324, 327-28, 340-43, 346-47; see also William C. Banks, EPA Bends to Industry Pressure
on Coal NSPS- and Breaks, 9 ECOLoGY L.Q. 67, 114-16 (1980) (arguing that provisions that
did this are too lenient). Hence, if a plant operator developed some completely new approach
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based limitations or with all traditional regulation seems inappropriate. Use
of the term "command and control" to describe either technology-based
regulation or all traditional regulation misleads government officials, students,
and some scholars.6
that met these standards, the utility could use it.
Operators probably could not meet this standard solely through the use of coal washing,
because coal washing, which was not anew innovation at the time, probably could not produce
a seventy percent reduction by itself. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 368-73; Ackerman &
Hassler, supra note 58, at 1481; Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New
Deal: Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1412, 1421-22 n.43 (1981); cf. Latin, supra note 59, at 1277 n.41
(noting that standard allows using coal washing as offset, decreasing percentage reduction
needed from scrubbing); ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 58, at 15, 66-68 (noting that coal
washing reduces any given emissions base by only twenty to forty percent, but replacing new
source standards with less stringent reduction requirement that also applies to existing sources
would produce better results).
Reading Professor Ackerman's reference to the NSPS as a standard based on "full
scrubbing" to indicate that the NSPS precluded subsequent innovations meeting the numerical
standards would involve technical misunderstanding of the regulation. See Sierra Club, 657
F.2d at 316 (stating that "given the present state ofpollution control technology, utilities will
have to employ some form of ... scrubbing" (emphasis added)); see also Latin, supra note 59,
at 1276-78 & nn.39-47 (criticizing "full scrubbing" characterization as inaccurate, but stating
that "given the current state of control technology" some form of scrubbing will be required)
(emphasis added).
61. Congress sometimes directs implementing agencies to establish effects-based emission
limitations. This means that the implementing agency must set an emission limitation at a level
adequate to protect human health (health-based standards) and/or the environment See Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(discussing effects based limitations for hazardous air pollutants). Some statutory provisions
direct agencies to regulate based on some kind ofweighing of costs and benefits. See Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down partial asbestos ban
as inconsistent with Toxic Substances Control Act's (TSCA's) cost-benefit standard); John S.
Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk Information Regulatory Policy, and Toxic
Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 269 (1991) (noting that Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and TSCA use language authorizing action to prevent
"unreasonable" adverse effects and have legislative history calling for balancing of costs and
benefits); Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic
Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 304-09 (1990) (stating that FIFRA and TSCA are risk-
balancing statutes).
The cost-benefit, effects-based, and technology-based limitations evaluate costs and
benefits, environmental and/or health effects, and technology respectively in order to arrive at
the level of reductions required. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217 (limit
based upon cost-benefit criterion); NaturalResources Defense Council, 824 F.2d at 1147 (limit
based upon health effects); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 316-17 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(limit based upon technology). These criteria determine the stringency of standards, not their
form. See Corrosion ProofFittings, 947 F.2d at 1217 (striking down stringent limitations for
lack of cost-benefit justification); Natural Resources Defense Council, 824 F.2d at 1164-66
(striking down lax limitation for failing to adequately protect health), Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at
311-312 (upholding limitas neithertoo lax nortoo stringent under technology-based approach).
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Polluters have substantial economic incentives to use the flexibility that
performance standards offer to employ innovative means of meeting emission
limitations that are less costly than traditional compliance methods. Such use
of innovations saves polluters money. This incentive exists even for technol-
ogy-based performance standards that did not contemplate the innovative
compliance mechanism a polluter discovers.62
Professor Stewart has stated that polluters have "strong incentives to
adopt the particular technology underlying"-a technology-based performance
standard because "its use will readily persuade regulators of compliance."'63
It seems unlikely that this countervailing persuasiveness incentive would over-
come the economic incentive to realize savings through an effective and
cheaper innovation, even if the persuasiveness incentive were powerful.
Moreover, polluters have a number of means of persuading regulators that
their innovations perform adequately if they in fact do so. First, polluters may
monitor their pollution directly to demonstrate compliance. Second, in some
cases polluters may eliminate regulated chemicals, which certainly demon-
strates compliance."
While polluters have an equally powerful economic incentive to use
cheaper alternative compliance methods for true command and control regula-
tions, the polluter may have more difficulty persuading a regulator that an
alternative is viable if she cannot measure emissions directly. Nevertheless,
the polluter can deploy her substantial expertise to estimate the effectiveness
of alternative techniques and may persuade regulators to accept alternatives.
Indeed, she may persuade a regulator that a less effective technique is equally
effective, because the regulator may feel insecure in second-guessing a com-
pany's judgment. In any case, empirical studies of actual responses to regula-
tion do not support the idea that technology-based performance standards
frequently discourage innovation by dissuading companies with innovative
compliant technologies from using them to meet the standards.65
62. See, e.g., OFFICEOFTECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GAUGING CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH - AN
APPRAISAL OF OSHA's ANALYTIC APPROACH, OTA-ENV-635 64 (1995) ("Affected industries
achieved compliance through adopting control measures that differed considerably from those
that OSHA's rulemaking analyses presumed in confirming feasibility").
63. Stewart, supra note 30, at 1269. Professor Stewart refers to technology-based per-
formance standards as "engineering standards." Id. at 1268-69.
64. Additionally, some performance standards are based in part upon pollution prevention
and do not specify the precise materials or process changes required and/or contemplate a range
of possible responses. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Categories: Aerospace Manufacturing and Rework Facilities, 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.741-53
(1996). The author represented the Natural Resources Defense Council in the rulemaking
proceeding that produced this regulation.
65. Professor Stewart cites no empirical support for such a notion. See Stewart, supra
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One can apply a narrower, yet more persuasive, rigidity criticism to
traditional regulation than the claim that traditional regulation rigidly dictates
compliance methods. Traditional regulation often specifies the precise source
from which emission reductions must come.' This means that polluters
cannot substitute reductions from someplace other than the pollution source
that a traditional regulation addresses, even if doing so costs less. Spatial
specificity is a form of rigidity.
Spatial specificity, however, helps make standards enforceable. A regu-
latory agency, citizen group, or corporation seeking to evaluate compliance (or
even just the existence of reductions in pollution) must generally look at each
place where regulated pollution escapes into the environment in order to
determine whether emission reductions have occurred. 7 Hence, it seems
logical to specify obligations for specific places where emission reductions
can be verified. Where a company cannot reliably measure emissions, a
regulator or citizen may determine whether a reduction has occurred at these
places by determining whether the polluter has properly applied a technique
known to reduce emissions at that particular place.6" An understanding of the
reasons for spatial specificity need not lead to the conclusion that only tradi-
tional regulation makes sense. However, programsthat lessen spatial specific-
ity only produce real verifiable emission reductions when they adequately
note 30, at 1269. The empirical literature actually shows that industry sometimes chooses
techniques different from those relied upon in standard setting. For example, a recent Office
of Technology Assessment study concluded that industries had often used techniques not relied
upon by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in standard setting to comply. See
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSEsSMENT, supra note 62, at 64 ("Affected industries achieved
compliance through adopting control measures that differed considerably from those that
OSHA's rulemaking analyses presumed in confirming feasibility."). Performance standards'
failure to stimulate innovation in other cases seems to reflect a rather complex set of factors,
including a lack of stringency in the standard. See Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton
Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS, 109, 139-40 (Summer 1983). This author has found no empirical support for the
notion that the regulatory process frequently discourages cost saving innovations that would
bring about adequate compliance with a performance standard. See id. at 141 (noting that
Richard Stewart offers no evidence to support his assumption that regulation is a barrier to
innovation).
66. See Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
67. Because air and water disperse pollution rapidly after discharge into the environment,
measuring pollution after discharge often does not reveal whether a particular polluter has
reduced pollution to meet legal requirements. See Richard E. Ayers, Enforcement ofAirPollu-
tion Controls on StationarySources Under the CleanAirAmendments of1970,4ECOLOGYL.Q.
441,451 (1975).
68. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 294-295 (1978)
(Stevens J., dissenting) (describing technique of watering down building to reduce asbestos
emissions during building demolition).
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address the enforcement problems they create.69 Lack of spatial specificity
complicates enforcement by increasing the number and variety of claims,
transactions, and activities that a regulator must evaluate to detect noncompli-
ance.
70
The notion that traditional regulation discourages innovation because of
rigidity does not withstand analysis. In fact, very rigid regulations that com-
pletely banned the production and use of certain chemicals have led to wide-
spread innovation.71 For example, outright bans of ozone depleting chemicals
stimulated the development of substitutes, thereby realizing an enormously
important environmental improvement at little or no cost.72 Zero emission
standards for automobiles have forced the development of electric vehicles.'
Undemanding traditional regulation may fail to stimulate innovation, but more
demandingtraditional regulation-sometimes described astechnology forcing-
often provides significant incentives to innovate.74
69. SeeNancy J. Cohen, CommentEmissionsTradingandAirToxicsEmissions Reclaim
and Toxics Regulation in the South CoastAir Basin, I 1 UCLA J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y255, 260-
63 (1993) (discussing enforcement issues in proposed California emissions trading program).
70. This article discusses enforcement problems in more detail below. See infra notes
121-31 and accompanying text.
71. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-ForcinginEnvironmentalRegulation,
27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943,944-52 (1994) (discussing EPA regulations banning lead and certain
pesticides).
72. See CuRTIs MOORE &ALLAN MILLER, GREEN GOLD: JAPAN, GERMANY, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE RACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL. TECHNOLOGY 108-09, 191-93 (1994).
73. Miller, supra note 53, at 66-67.
74. See Nicholas A. Ashford, Understanding Technological Responses of Industrial
Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications for Government Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH NEEDS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 277,296 (Kurt Fischer & Johan Shot eds., 1993); Ashford et al., supra note 53,
at 426, 429-43, 463-64; TORNATZKY& FLEISCHER, supra note 30, at 174 (noting that environ-
mental regulation has stimulated innovation); see also Ashford & Heaton, supra note 65, at 140-
41 (noting that creative responses to regulation in chemical industry occurs in response to
regulation precipitated "crises" or through actions of new entrants and correlates with strin-
gency); Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to
Foster the Innovation andDiffusion ofEnvironmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
3,20-21 (1996) (noting that technology-based standards provide incentives for pollution control
industry to develop new technology and stating that Germany, top exporter of environmental
technology, uses such standards); Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of
Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology
Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-43, S-45 (1995) (noting that technology-based
standards, command and control standards, and market-based approaches all have the potential
to induce technological change); Jean Olson Lanjouw & Ashoka Mody, Innovation and the
InternationalDiffusion ofEnvironmentallyResponsive Technology, 25 RES. POL'Y 549, 549-51
(1996) (remarking that innovation responds to pollution abatement expenditures, indicating
severity of environmental regulation).
ECONOIHC INCENTIVES
2. The Lack of Incentives Problem
Critics also advance the claim that "command and control" regulation
provides no incentive to go beyond complying with current regulatory require-
ments and fails to provide continuous incentives for environmental improve-
ment.75 This charge that traditional regulation provides no incentive to reduce
pollution below required levels does not completely survive rigorous analysis.
Polluters subject to performance standards usually emit much less than their
permits allow in order to make sure that they consistently comply with regula-
tory standards.76 Hence, the enforceability of traditional standards can pro-
vide an incentive to surpass them to some degree. Moreover, polluters have
an incentive to reduce pollution substantially below regulated levels when
meeting a more stringent level costs less than meeting the level regulation
requires.
Qualifying the lack of incentive inducements of traditional regulations,
however, reveals a narrower, but still important, problem with traditional
regulatory incentives. Traditional regulation offers little incentive to spend
additional monies to reduce pollution more than necessary to protect oneself
from enforcement penalties, when the costs of doing so exceed the costs of
adequate compliance.
3. Complexity, Uncertainty, and Delay
Traditional regulation also seems unlikely to provide continual incentives
to reduce. Traditional regulation provides little incentive to make additional
reductions once an adequate compliance cushion exists. Accordingly, tradi-
tional regulation requires repeated government decision making in order to
make progress in reducing emissions. Absent revisions of standards, progress
in reducing may stall. Predictable, stringent environmental regulation may
provide incentives to continue reducing pollution in between regulatory
decisions. A possibility of government inaction or delay (or doubts about the
stringency of future limitations), however, may lead polluters to decide
against making further improvements at complying pollution sources.
Critics claim that technology-based regulation involves inordinate com-
plexity and delay.77 Thus, even if technology-based regulation does have the
theoretical ability to stimulate continuous innovation, the uncertainty created
by the complex information gathering process, the formal administrative
75. See La Pierre, supra note 30, at 774; see also Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 5, at
220-21.
76. See generally Economic Incentive Program Rules, 58 Fed. Reg. 11,110, 11,117
(1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) (proposed Feb. 23, 1993).
77. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 6, at 174; Stewart, supra note 30, at 1273-77.
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process, and industry opposition (often backed by litigation) frequently thwart
innovation."
This claim fully applies to emissions limitations that administrative
agencies set, but the argument that the formal administrative process and
industry initiated litigation create uncertainty generally does not apply to
congressionally-set emissions limitations.79 Congressionally specified limits
have become more common in recent years.8" These claims of delay and
uncertainty apply even more to health-based standards and cost-benefit stand-
ards than they do to technology-based standards. For health-based standards
and cost-benefit-based standards have proven even more difficult to imple-
ment than technology-based standards.8 '
The term "economic incentive" is attractive because it promises redemp-
tion from the plodding nature of governmental decisions. Part III addresses
the question whether emissions trading actually offers such redemption. 2
4. The Inefficiency of Uniform Standards
The most persuasive theoretical criticism of traditional regulation focuses
on the economic inefficiency of uniform standards - legal rules that apply the
same emission limitations to all pollution sources that the rule addresses. 3
78. See Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 570-75 (1979); Stewart, supra note 30, at
1273-77, 1283-84, 1294-95.
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994) (describing informal rulemaking procedures for admin-
istrative agencies, not Congress); Turner v. Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)
(economic legislation presumed constitutional); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,487-
88 (1955) (stressing deference due legislative decisions); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (regulatory statutes will be upheld unless lacking a rational
basis).
80. See David M. Driesen, Five Lessons From Clean Air Act Implementation, 14 PAcE
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 52-54 (1997); Driesen, supra note 21, at 554, 606-07. Although substitu-
tion of congressional decisions for administrative decisions provides escape from some of the
problems in administrative decision making, problems with the legislative process may still
exist.
81. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 601-05; Driesen, supra note 80, at 55; Howard Latin,
Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean AirAct, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647,
1660-66 (1991) (explaining reasons why technology-based standards work better in practice);
Latin, supra note 59, at 1304-14 (summarizing EPA experience under harm-based approaches);
see also Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based
Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,329, 10,330 (July
1997) (describing how state regulation based on water quality rather than technology has proven
ineffective).
82. See infra Part III.
83. See James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing
Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 369 (1989) (providing
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Because facilities have unequal compliance costs, uniform standards demand
relatively expensive reductions from some facilities without securing greater
reductions from facilities with lower compliance costs." Hence, uniform
standards may use private sector resources that are devoted to pollution
control inefficiently. 5
This efficiency critique is correct, but incomplete. If marginal costs vary
significantly between facilities, then any scheme that tailors reductions to
each pollution source's marginal costs can improve efficiency, meaning the
efficient use of private sector resources.86 But this critique does not consider
efficient use of public sector resources.
While tailored regulation may make more efficient use of private capital,
it may make inefficient use of taxpayer funds devoted to crafting and enforc-
ing regulations. More tailored regulatory approaches may prove more
expensive to design and/or enforce." In order to determine whether any
given alternative to uniform regulation will prove more globally efficient, one
must evaluate enforceability, ease of administration, and other relevant con-
cerns.
8 9
The private economic efficiency criticism does not properly apply to all
traditional regulation. It applies to regulatory programs that consist of uni-
form emissions standards for all facilities in a category.9° Many environmen-
tal statutes, including the Clean Air Act91 and Federal Water Pollution Control
examples of uniform standards).
84. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 6.
85. See Richard B. Stewart, Economic, Environment, and the Limits ofLegal Control, 9
HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1985).
86. For an explanation of marginal costs see ALLEN V. KNEESE& CHARLES L. SCHULTZE,
POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 18-26 (1975).
87. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 'Race" and
Is It "To the Bottom'?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271,287-88 (1997) (discussing economies of scale
rationale for centralized standard setting and market efficiencies for interstate commerce);
RESEARCHANDPOLICY COMMITrEEOFTHECOMMITrEEFORECONOMICDEVELOPMENT, WHAT
PRICE CLEAN AIR? AMARKETAPPROACH TO ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 40 (1993)
[hereinafter CED] ("The principal advantage of the command-and-control approach is that it
is often easy to administer."); Latin, supra note 59, at 1271 (arguing that uniform standards
offer decreased information collection and evaluation costs, more predictable results, better
public access, reduced opportunity for obstructive behavior by regulated parties, and increased
likelihood of surviving judicial review).
88. See Derzko, supra note 74, at 52 n.255; Latin, supra note 59, at 1314-31 (discussing
experiences with site-specific variances); Stewart, supra note 30, at 1318.
89. See generally Latin, supra note 59.
90. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 5-6 (applying efficiency critique to uniform
technology-based standards).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
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Act,"92 which are usually cited as prime examples of a uniform technology-
based approach, rely heavily upon nonuniform and even facility-specific
decisions.93
92. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
93. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act permit and often require states to choose
control strategies to meet standards for environmental quality. See, e.g., PUD No. I v. Wash-
ington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994) (holding that state may impose instream
flow requirements on proposed hydroelectric project under Clean Water Act); Union Elec. v.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976) (noting Clean Air Act's reliance on state emission limitations);
Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d'782, 785, 789-791 (4th Cir. 1988)
(discussing limits of federal authority over nonuniform state waste treatment programs); see also
Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1045 &
n.427 (1995) (discussing state nonpoint source programs). In some instances, these statutes
specifically require or permit tailored standards in individual permitting proceedings. See, e.g.,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 850 (1984)
(noting that state agency determines compliance with "LAER" standards for new sources in
permitting process); Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339, 1339 (6th Cir. 1991)
(reviewing facility specific RACT decision involving revision to state's implementation plan);
Adler, supra, at 1045 n.427 (discussing state discretion regarding runoff controls). Often, even
federal programs involve tailored individual permitting decisions with few uniform standards.
See generally Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis ofAlternatives Under Section
404 ofthe Clean WaterAct and Similar EnvironmentalLaws, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 773 (1989)
(analyzing federal permit requirements protecting wetlands). Nonuniformity exists for some
extremely significant pollution sources. For example, electric utility emission rates vary widely
from state to state. See, e.g., NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BENCHMARKING AiR
EMIssIONs OF UTILITY ELECTIC GENERATORS IN THE EASTERN U.S. 5 (1997).
The Clean Air Act requires EPA to set uniform air quality standards that states must meet.
See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding ambient air
quality standards). But because baseline state air quality and the mixture of pollution sources
vary, so do the amount of required reductions and the mix of controls from existing sources.
See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 58, at 1477.
Professor Stewart minimizes the extent of decentralized decision making under the Clean
Air and Clean Water acts. He writes:
[T]he uniform technology-based standards in the Clean Air Act Amendments and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, by imposing the same control require-
ments on all new or existing sources plants within a given industry, discourage
firms from relocating in areas of high environmental quality.
Stewart, supra note 30, at 1266 (footnotes omitted). His later writing then repeatedly refers to
"centralized uniform standards." See, e.g., Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 156. The Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts set, or require the EPA to set, minimum uniform national emission
standards for certain pollutants from industrial source categories and new automobiles for the
reasons stated by Professor Stewart. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a),
7412(d), 7521 (1994); Shanty Town, 843 F.2d at 784-85 (discussing federal role in regulating
water quality and NPDES permit system under Clean Water Act). But states often may impose
more stringent limitations than these minimum standards and states also set limitations for many
pollution sources that these standards do not apply to. Hence, the conventional picture of
uniform standards dominating environmental law is, at best, unbalanced.
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Uniform standards have equitable advantages that may outweigh the
monetary efficiencies theoretically achievable from nonuniform standards.
Uniform standards treat facilities equally and allow administrative agencies
to secure reductions from a large group of facilities through a single standard
setting proceeding.94 The pointthatuniform standards theoretically use private
sectorcompliance resources with lessthan ideal efficiency, however, is correct.
5. Some Conclusions About the Conventional Critique
The conventional critique of traditional regulation exaggerates its defects
and ignores its strengths. Traditional regulation usually does not command
and control compliance methods, but it does provide spatially specific require-
ments in order to facilitate enforcement. Traditional regulation encourages
innovation when sufficiently stringent, but not otherwise. Although tradi-
tional regulation provides incentives to go beyond compliance when doing so
saves money or provides a "cushion" against enforcement, it does not provide
continuous incentives to spend additional money to go beyond the cushion.
Traditional regulation also suffers from problems of complex administrative
decision making, at least for those decisions that administrators, rather than
Congress, make. Uniform standards, while equitable and administratively
efficient, may prove economically inefficient for pollution sources.
Because traditional regulation consists primarily of performance stan-
dards, scholars and policy-makers should abandon the command and con-
trol/economic incentive dichotomy. The term "traditional regulation," rather
than the misleading command and control epithet, could be used to describe
regulatory categories that include performance standards. Lobbyists for
regulated industries may use the term "command and control" without regard
to accuracy, because it helps undermine the political legitimacy of traditional
regulation. Scholarly proponents recognize that emissions trading cannot
wholly supplant traditional regulation" and should therefore avoid terminol-
ogy that unfairly undermines traditional regulation.
94. See Engel, supra note 87, at 293 (stating that centralized uniform standard setting
creates "level playing field" for economic competition); Stewart, supra note 30, at 1266; cf N.
Hanley et al., Why is More Notice not Taken of Economists' Prescriptions for the Control of
Pollution?, 22 ENv'T & PLAN. A. 1421, 1426 (1990) (stating that agencies prefer to interpret
equitable policy as one that imposes equal emission limitations instead of equal costs on all).
95. See, e.g., WILLIAMJ.BAUMOL&WALLACEE. OATES, THETHEORY OFENvIRONmN-
TAL POLICY 190 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he ideal policy package contains a mixture of instruments,
with taxes, marketable permits, [and] direct control... each used in certain circumstances to
regulate the sources of environmental damage."); DALES, supra note 1, at 98 (contending that
emissions trading is impracticable for "diffuse" pollution); Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 15
("The best set ofpolicies will typically involve a mix of market and more conventional regula-
tory processes.").
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Responsible emissions trading proponents have sound reasons for recog-
nizing a continued need for traditional regulation.96 If a buyer of pollution
credits produces emissions with strong local health effects, for example,
cancer-causing hazardous air pollutants, and is distant from the seller of
credits, then ethical considerations may preclude allowing the buyer to avoid
making reductions at her own plant, even if she purchases an equal quantity
of emission reductions elsewhere.97 The buyers's purchase of credits from the
seller does not justify allowing the buyers's pollution to continue to cause
cancer in the buyer's neighborhood."
Furthermore, most scholars recognize that emissions trading requires
good monitoring in order to succeed.9 Because pollution sources have an
economic incentive to try to exaggerate the value of reduction credits and to
understate the value of debits in an emissions trading scheme, good monitor-
ing is essential. 00 For some pollution sources, however, good monitoring
96. The practical difficulties here provide only a sample. See Hanley et al., supra note
94, at 1428-31 (discussing practical difficulties in establishing effluent charges and/or tradeable
permits).
97. See Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 161 ("A marketable permit system... [may] not
be appropriate in dealing with pollutants or chemical risks that have localized 'threshold'
effects, causing serious damage only if they exceed a given concentration at a particular
location"); see also Cohen, supra note 69, at 260-64 (discussing potential toxics issues in
California's earlier trading proposal).
98. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 14.
99. See Hahn&Hester, supra note 5, at 111 (contending that monitoring and enforcement
issues play critical role in efficient design of regulatory approaches); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation,
1991 DUKEL.J. 729,748-49 (1991)("[E]missions trading and pollution taxes require inspectors
to monitor constantly the amount of pollution that a plant emits."); Stewart, Risks, supra note
5, at 161, 166.
100. Professor Tietenberg argues that some emission trades can reduce the difficulties of
monitoring. See T.H. TIETENBERG, EMIssIoNs TRADING 181 (1985). His analysis supporting
that argument may not hold up to scrutiny. He states that allowing substitution of relatively
monitorable reductions in large stacks for reductions from fugitive sources eased enforcement
because it shifts control to the sources easiest to monitor. Id. at 181-82. Yet an enforcer has no
way of knowing whether the reductions produced by the large stacks equal what the plant would
have obtained from reducing the fugitive sources unless it measures the emissions from the
fugitive sources and knows what percentage reductions the foregone fugitive controls would
have produced (fugitive emissions standards usually establish work practices rather than
requirements for a specified quantity of reductions, because emissions are unmonitorable and
unpredictable). The example professor Tietenberg cites probably involves an easy gaming
opportunity for a pollution source. By simply supplying a low estimate of the unmonitored
foregone fugitive emission reductions, the source can claim that modest "extra" stack emission
reductions are equivalent, whether or not this is true. In fact, emissions trading doubles the
monitoring difficulty because a trade is only reliable if reliable monitoring exists at two places,
the source of credits and the source of debits.
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simply is not technically feasible.' 1
For this reason, emissions trading cannot supplant true command and
control regulation.' 2 Normally, command and control regulation exists
precisely because an agency has determined that it cannot measure emission
reductions. 3 Emissions trading may sometimes provide a good alternative
to performance standards, but it will function poorly if used to supplant true
command and control regulation. Hence, the command and control/economic
incentive dichotomy not only unfairly disparages traditional regulation, it




The conventional critique does not address the issue of whether a tradi-
tional regulatory program should be considered an economic incentive pro-
gram. Nor can a critique of traditional regulation tell us whether emissions
trading will overcome traditional regulation's shortcomings. A careful
analysis of emissions trading and a theory of economic incentives are neces-
sary to address these questions properly.
B. Emissions Trading's Mixed Record of Environmental Performance
Proponents of emissions trading generally claim that economic incentive
programs will remedy the defects that they attribute to traditional regulation
101. Examples of pollutants that one cannot monitor effectively include agricultural run-
off, an important source of water pollution, and "fugitive" air emissions. See, e.g., National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; Organic Hazardous Air
Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Seven Other
Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608, 62,646 (1992) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63)
(proposed Dec. 31, 1992); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 294-95
(1978) (Stevens, L, dissenting) (work practice standard promulgated for asbestos because
asbestos emissions from demolition cannot be measured). See generally Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 317 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Fugitive air emissions escape into the atmosphere
at places too numerous to monitor effectively. See also Suzi Clare Kerr, Contracts and Trade-
able Permit Markets in International and Domestic Environmental Protection 66 (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author) ("[A] command and control system
may be the only feasible instrument when the costs of monitoring emissions or inputs is
extremely high .....
102. See Kerr, supra note 101, at 66.
103. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
Categories; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufac-
turing Industry and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608, 62,646 (1992) (codified as
amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposed Dec. 31, 1992);Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 294-
95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (work practice standard promulgated for asbestos because asbestos
emissions from demolition cannot be measured); Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 317 n.38.
104. But see Note, Doing the Right Thing for Profit: Markets, Trade, and Advancing
Environmental Protection, 44 DRAKEL. REV. 611, 612 (1996) (contending that "free markets"
can supplant command and control schemes).
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by promoting efficiency,105 stimulating innovation,"s and providing continu-
ous incentives to go beyond regulatory requirements.0 7 They invoke the
image of a free market system producing better environmental quality through
unleashed innovative energy with little need for slow ponderous government
decision making." ' These advocates claim that emissions trading constitutes
an economic incentive program with the features mentioned above."
Emissions trading theoretically offers some efficiency advantages over
traditional regulation to the extent that significant differences in the marginal
cost of pollution control exist between pollution sources.Y1 For example, if
a regulator wishes to obtain eighty tons of total reductions from two pollution
sources each emitting one hundred tons she could require each source to make
a forty ton reduction. If one source, Seller, has control costs of $ 1,000 per ton
and another, Buyer, has control costs of $3,000 per ton, then this eighty ton
reduction will cost $160,000 ($40,000 spent at Seller and $120,000 at Buyer).
Suppose, however, that the regulator allows Seller and Buyer to trade as long
as they produce eighty tons of total reductions. Buyer may choose to pay
Seller to produce forty tons of additional reductions (beyond the forty Seller
already will produce) and forego making any reductions at Buyer. Buyer need
only pay Seller a little more than $40,000 to realize an economic benefit.
Thus, in this example, *pollution trading allows the same reduction for less
money, $80,000"' rather than $160,000."'
Since the end of the 1970s, EPA has encouraged states to authorize
various forms of emissions trading, usually between units within a plant,
under the Clean Air Act."' These programs allowed pollution sources to
105. Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 159.
106. Id. at 160; Keohane et al., supra note 42, at 2 n.5.
107. Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 160, 163.
108. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 7 & n.26 (stating that economic incentive
systems ensure that firms "automatically" undertake pollution control efforts and invoking
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" metaphor for a free market).
109. See id. at 7-10, 12-13; Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 158-60.
110. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 83, at 374.
111. $40,000 + $40,000 = $80,000.
112. $40,000 + $120,000 = $160,000. See Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 159.
113. This Article focuses on the Clean Air Act because it has been the predominant forum
for experiments with emissions trading. See generally RICHARD A. LIRoFF, AIR POLLUTION
OFFSETS: TRADING SELLING AND BANKING (1980). Administrative agencies have experimented
with emissions trading and similar approaches under other laws as well. See, e.g., Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (1997) (discussing use of"Transferable
Development Rights" under interstate compact); Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs:
Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IowA L. REv. 527, 527-30 (1996) (discussing
wetland regulation and production/withdrawal of wetland mitigation credits).
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escape spatially specific construction bans, strict pollution controls for new
pollution sources, and existing source emission regulations in exchange for
claimed reductions elsewhere."' Scholars often assert that these programs,
sometimes collectively referred to as "bubbles," 15 greatly reduce compliance
costs." 6 Generally, these assertions rely on econometric models rather than
empirical studies comparing the actual costs of traditional programs to compa-
rable trading regimes after implementation.
11 7
The literature often fails to address adequately the question of whether
emissions trading, now almost two decades old, has, in fact, stimulated
innovation or even produced the emission reductions that comparable tradi-
tional regulation would generate.1 Unfortunately, the history of emissions
trading reveals no evidence that emissions trading and its precursors have
stimulated innovation or environmental performance superior to comparable
traditional regulation."1 9
114. For explanations of pollution offsets (in lieu of a construction ban), netting (in lieu
of new source controls), and bubbles (in lieu of controls on existing sources of pollution), see
LIROFF, supra note 41, at xix-xxi, 4-7. See also Errol Meidinger, The Development ofEmis-
sions Trading in US. Air Pollution Regulation, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 153 (1989)
(Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1989) (providing history of these mechanisms and
reasons for their adoption). See generally Comment, Emission-OffsetBanking: Accommodating
Industrial Growth with Air-Quality Standards, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 937 (1980).
115. Air pollution control experts sometimes generically use the term "bubble" to refer to
all of these mechanisms and sometimes use it to refer to existing source bubbles only, as
opposed to netting and offsets. See LIROFF,supra note 41, at 4-7 (discussing basics of bubbles,
netting, and offsets).
116. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 171-72; Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at
128; Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 74, at S-43 to -44.
117. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 171-72; Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at
128; Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 74, at S-43 to -44. Professors Ackerman and Stewart, for
example, cite estimates of costs made before implementation, rather than actual post-implemen-
tation studies of cost, to bolster their empirical case. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1349 n.38 (citing regulatory
impact analysis prepared during development of regulations, not after compliance). They cite
Tietenberg's book on emissions trading fortheproposition that emissions trading "has achieved"
$700 million in savings. Iae at 1348 & n.37. This figure includes bubbles, approved, proposed,
or under development. TITENBERGsupra note 100, at53. This figure obviously includes and
may consist entirely of precompliance estimates. To assume that emissions trading generates
some cost savings is reasonable, but the magnitude will remain uncertain until we have studies
comparing traditional regulations to comparable trading programs after compliance.
118. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 15-16.
119. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 5, at 234 (discussing claims that little innovation
has in fact occurred through emissions trading). Professors Dudek and Palmisano cannot cite
a single instance of trading ever having stimulated any significant innovation. Instead, they first
assert that there is little need for innovation, thereby avoiding making any claim that trading has
promoted innovation. I at 235. They then refer to "recent data on trading in California"
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1. Bubbles: Inadequate Environmental Performance
The empirical literature raises especially serious questions about whether
bubbles have spurred adequate environmental performance.' 20 The few
studies of bubble implementation reveal that polluters often could not docu-
ment claims that they had made the emission reductions that regulatory
requirements underlying bubbles had required.'21 Polluters almost never
confirming that "invention and innovation will result from emissions trading programs." Id at
236 (emphasis added). They fail to cite any actual data and the use of the future tense makes
it unclear whether they are referring to some actual experience or a prediction about future
experience.
Similarly, Professor Stewart asserts that emissions trading systems "have ... encouraged
innovation." Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 161. Perhaps he means this as a theoretical, rather
than an empirical, observation. He may mean not that emissions trading has caused innovation,
but that trading theoretically encourages innovation. In any event, he does not cite empirical
data showing any actual innovation that emissions trading has stimulated. See id.
120. See LIROFF, supra note 113, at 28-29 (noting need to avoid "paper offsets," reductions
in emissions that exist only on paper); see also Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 5, at 236
(noting that emissions trading has been "the harbinger of bad news").
121. For example, when EPA and its California counterpart inspected plants to verify
compliance with bubble regulations for the aerospace industry in the late 1980s, they found that
"almost all large sources operating under. . . bubbles ... are not achieving the emission
reductions or levels of control that are required." See CALiFORNIAAiRRESOuRCE BOARD AND
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONAGENCY, PHASE Ill RULEEFECvENESS STUDY
OF THE AEROSPACE COATING INDUSTRY 4 (1990) (unpublished report, on file with author); see
also David Doniger, The DarkSide of the Bubble, 4 ENVTL. F., July 1985, at 33, 34-35; LRoFF,
supra note 41, at 80-89 (providing examples of bubbles that avoided requirements to reduce
actual emission levels). Hahn and Hester have concluded that emissions trading (demfied to
include bubbling and netting) "has had a negligible effect on environmental quality." Hahn &
Hester, supra note 5, at 137 (footnote omitted). They do not, however, base this assertion on
empirical data. Rather, Professors Hahn and Hester rely "on the fact that the rules governing
the various trading programs contain prohibitions against trades that would result in significant
increases in emissions." Id. at 137 n.146. They do not explain the basis for their belief that
these rules are adequate and the implicit assumption that these prohibitions have been regularly
and correctly enforced. In any case, subsequent experience suggests they have not prevented
abuse.
The claim that bubbles have had a "negligible effect" on environmental quality is con-
sistent with the conclusion that bubbles have been a failure. If this negligible effect claim
means that bubbles have not produced increases in pollution relative to baseline levels, then the
negligible effect constitutes gross failure. For the Clean Air Act and many of the rules in state
implementation plans authorizing bubbles were supposed to produce decreases in emissions,
rather than just limit increases in areas not meeting air quality standards. See, e.g., United
States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing
bubble proposal as alternative emission reduction option); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that EPA does not dispute that Con-
gress designed new source review standards for nonattainment areas to promote clean-up not
just maintenance of air quality standards), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Citizens Against the Refinery's
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undertook fresh pollution control projects to satisfy these regulations."
Instead, they claimed credits for incidental reductions that would have oc-
curred without the regulation." For example, polluters often claimed credits
for routine business decisions to slow down production or shut down facili-
ties." Without the ability to trade, the underlying regulation would trigger
a fresh reduction that would supplement any incidental reductions. The
Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1981) (explaining that offset requirement was
designed to produce "positive net air quality benefit").
The actual conclusions of EPA officials relying on real data that Hahn and Hester cite
seem consistent with failure. They report no reductions in actual emissions. Hahn & Hester,
supra note 5, at 129 & n.105 (describing relevant data). Hahn and Hester also cite a statement
from the head of the Reagan Era EPA's regulatory reform staff, the primary advocate of
emissions trading within EPA, stating that bubbles led to "substantially greater emissions
reductions than conventional limits, with the rest producing equivalent reductions." Id. at 129
& n.104. Hahn and Hester cite no real data supporting these statements. Dr. Liroff has stated
that the statements of the regulatory reform staff have been misleading as to bubble perfor-
mance. LIROFF, supra note 41, at 62-67.
122. See Doniger, supra note 121, at 34-35.
123. Dr. Liroff provides many examples of these bubbles. See LIROFF, supra note 41, at
62-67, 89-91. Dr. Liroff explains that states lured new plants in the 1970s by providing them
with offsets that the state itself created. LROFF, supra note 113, at 13-17. One offset consisted
of a paper credit for "an asphalt substitution process that already was occurring for nonenvir-
onmental reasons." Id at 16; accord Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643
F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1981). Liroff states that "the offset policy can be a meaningless paper
game for abating pollution." LIROFF, supra note 113, at 22.
However, the experience varies from state to state. Id. Dr. Liroff cites some examples
of bubbles that he regards as models. His evaluation of these bubbles clearly shows that they
reduced emissions below prior baseline levels. See, e.g., LIRoFF, supra note 41, at 68 (providing
example of actual emissions thousands of tons below uncontrolled levels). He concludes that
"bubbles can reduce emissions below levels otherwise required." Id at 69. However, he does
not appear to have compared the reductions that traditional regulation would have achieved to
the bubble regulation in all cases. See id. at 70-71.
Polluters have sought to claim credits even when they have taken no action to reduce
pollution below actual emissions level by seeking to measure emission reductions against an
"allowable" emissions baseline. See id. at 15-16 (discussing various baseline issues); Hahn &
Hester, supra note 5, at 116-17 (discussing difference between actual and allowable baselines).
Because pollution sources usually leave a "compliance cushion," this allows them to generate
a paper credit without doing anything to reduce pollution.
Federal rules authorize paper credits when they fail to prohibit claiming reduction credits
based on activities undertaken to meet state rules. If a pollution source can claim credits for
actions taken to comply with state rules, then regulations designed to create fresh reductions
from sources that the state has inadequately regulated will not accomplish anything. Polluters
will rely upon reductions undertaken to meet state requirements at adequately regulated sources
to justify their failure to make additional reductions at federally regulated units neglected by
state regulations. Absent trading, of course, polluters would make both the federally and state
mandated reduction, instead of using one of these reductions to justify foregoing the other.
124. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at 117-18; Comment, supra note 114, at 937.
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trading allowed polluters to claim credit for these incidental reductions in
order to avoid any real fresh emission decreases. The bubble regulations,
however, did not require polluters to assume debits for incidental emission
increases (e.g. from a production increase). Hence, gaming has been a prob-
lem.
EPA introduced bubbles primarily as deregulatory mechanisms,"z and
bubbles generally have stimulated neither innovation nor adequate environ-
mental performance at a cheaper price.26 Rather, they have generated cost
savings for industry, often by allowing unverifiable claims of compliance and
paper credits to substitute for actual emission reductions and by reducing
pollution reduction demands.'27
2. Lead Phase-Down: A Stringent Limitation Driving Substantial Change
EPA allowed gasoline producers to trade lead allowances during a phase-
down of lead from gasoline. 2 The lead phase-down created a substantial
change: the reformulation and then virtual elimination of leaded gasoline.'29
The driver for this achievement seems to be the underlying requirement of a
phase-down of lead. 30 Faithful implementation of a traditional phase-down
125. See LIROFF, supra note 41, at 37-38 (describing genesis of bubble idea in steel indus-
try).
126. LIROFF, supra note 41, at 100 (stating that "most innovations under bubbles merely
are rearrangements of conventional technologies").
127. See Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,668,
39,670 (1995) (proposed Aug. 3, 1995) ("Bubbles, netting and offsets have reduced sources'
overall compliance costs. However, there have been significant problems of quality control,
reducing the environmental effectiveness of the programs."); LROFF, supra note 41, at 99
("[C]ost saving approaches are not necessarily more cost-effective ways of meeting a goal;
instead, they may be ways to avoid costs that may be necessary to meet the goal"); David D.
Doniger, Point ... And Counterpoint, 4 ENVTL. F., Mar. 1986, at 29,34 ("In practice... there
has been far more innovation in shell games and sharp accounting practices than in pollution
control technology."); Richard A. Liroff, Point and Counterpoint: The Bubble: Will it Float
Free or Deflate, 4 ENVTL. F., Mar. 1986, at 28,30 (stating that compliance method that relaxes
regulatory requirements at some points without compensating reductions may be more prevalent
than bubbles that reduce actual emissions).
128. See Suzi Kerr & David Mare, Market Efficiency in Tradeable Permit Markets with
Transaction Costs: Empirical Evidencefrom the UnitedStates LeadPhasedown, in Kerr, supra
note 101, at 93-167 (discussing lead phase-down program); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361,380-91
(1989) (same). This article treats the lead phasedown program as an example oftrading because
this program authorized credit transfers. Because the rule authorized intertemporal trades, this
rule also exemplifies "banking" of emission credits. Id.
129. See Hahn& Hester, supra note 128, at 383; Kerr & Mare, supra note 128, at 99.
130. Hahn & Hester, supra note 128, at 132 n.125 (stating that "ratcheting down of the
standard" reduced lead sharply).
316
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
without trading probably would have produced the same change more
quickly.1
31
3. Acid Rain: Good Environmental Performance, Little Innovation
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act create a system oftransferra-
ble emissions allowances to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from large
electric utilities, the most prominent contributors to acid rain.'32 Two features
make the acid rain program far superior to EPA's bubbles.13 ' First, the
program caps the number of allowances for large utility units at a number
representing a large cut in emissions.'34 Bubbles usually did not cap the emis-
sions at regulated plants at a number representing a large cut in actual emis-
sions. 3 Indeed, bubbles often limited emission rates (not total emissions) at
131. The introduction of inter-refinery trading into the lead phasedown program probably
slowed the pace of environmental improvement EPA's 1985 trading rule actually led to
increased production of leaded gasoline in 1985. U.S. GENERALACCOUNTINGOFFICE,VEHCLE
EMISSIONS: EPA PROGRAM TO ASSIST LEADED-GASOLINE PRODUCERS 20 (1986) [hereinafter
GAO, VEHICLEEMISSIONS]. The increase in production of leaded gas occurred because the rule
allowed increased production of low lead gasoline to generate credits. See Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,116, 13,119 (1985) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Hahn & Hester, supra note 128, at 382 n.125. EPA's 1985 lead trading rule
supplanted a rule that required refiners to meet a standard of 1.1 grams of lead per leaded
gallon, effective January 1, 1986. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead
Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. at 13,116. The 1985 trading rule allowed refiners that banked purchased
credits to continue exceeding these limits through the end of 1987. Id at 13,117 (codified at
40 C.F.R. § 80.20(e)(2) (1988)). In actual implementation, inadequate reporting, compliance
verification, and enforcement may have marred environmental performance. See GAO, VEHICLE
EMISSIONS, supra, at 3-4, 18-19, 23-24 (citing failure to enforce against twenty-five potential
violators, forty-nine cases of claimed credits not matching claimed sales of credits, error rates
in reporting between 14% and 49.2%, and no verification of compliance); cf Hahn & Hester,
supra note 128, at 388 n.146.
132. See 11 RiCHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 865.5A[5], at 79a-329
(Patrick S. Rohan ed., 1997); Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce AcidDeposi-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 2707, 2708 (1991).
133. Unlike many bubbles, the acid rain program seems likely to approximate its stated
goals. See American Mun. Power Ohio v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1372, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Driesen,
supra note 80, at 57; Jeanne M. Dennis, Comment, Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems
ofthe Emissions Trading Program ofthe Clean AirActAmendments of1990, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1101, 1114-18 & n.54, 1125 (1993) (explaining program's goals).
134. American Mun., 98 F.3d at 1373; see Byron Swift, The AcidRain Test, 14 ENVTL. F.,
May-June 1997, at 17 (arguing that emissions cap is more important to acid rain program's
success than trading).
135. See Oregon Envtl. Council v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 34 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1001, 1006-1007, 1009-1010 (D. Or. 1992) (describing two bubbles that increased
plant-wide emissions and two that apparently held emissions constant relative to recent base-
lines).
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select parts of plants, while leaving other parts of the plant unregulated.'36
They generally allowed claims about activities at other parts of the plant, or
at other facilities, to substitute for meeting the spatially specific obligation.'37
Second, the acid rain program requires the use of continuous emission moni-
toring.' s Because actual baseline emission rates in electric utilities are
known, traded SO2 allowances will likely reflect actual emission reductions.'3 9
The bubbles often applied to poorly monitored emissions. 40
Thus far, the acid rain program has worked rather well. Plants use well-
known methods of emission control to avoid exceeding allowances. 4' The
plants have not employed substantial innovation, but such widespread diffu-
sion of standard technologies may represent a perfectly adequate way of
meeting many environmental goals. 1
42
Actual compliance with the acid rain requirements has cost much less
than government officials anticipated when Congress established the pro-
gram. 143 Economic incentive proponents credit the emissions trading mecha-
136. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 90-2447, 1991 WL
157261, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1991) (considering bubble as means of complying with
emissions rate expressed in pounds of volatile organic compounds emitted per gallon ofmaterial
used); United States v. Allsteel, No. 87 C 4638, 1989 WL 103405, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(unpublished disposition) (same); United States v. Alcan Foil Products, 694 F. Supp. 1280,
1281 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (same), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 889 F.2d 1513 (6th Cir. 1989).
137. See, e.g., NavistarInt'l Trans. Co. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339, 1344 n.10 (6th Cir. 1991)
(describing bubble using credits from shutdown of some sources to justify lack of controls on
another); Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1981)
(allowing petroleum refinery to offset its emissions with reductions realized through state use
of different asphalt to coat highways); Oregon Envtl. Council, 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1006-07 (describing bubbles that allowed unused production at one'pollution source and twenty
year old emission controls at another to justify not complying with subsequently promulgated
limits on emissions from coatings).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a) (1994).
139. See, e.g., S.REP.No. 101-228, at321 (Dec.20,1989), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3385, 3704.
140. See, e.g., Oregon Envtl. Council, 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1011.
141. Driesen, supra note 80, at 58; see Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591,593
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that principal compliance methods include fuel switching, clean coal,
and scrubbers).
142. See generally Driesen, supra note 80, at 56-58. Byron Swift claims the acid rain
program has "fostered significant innovation." Swift, supra note 134, at 17. The actual tech-
niques employed by utilities that Swift describes as innovative, such as fuel switching and the
use of scrubbers, are well known techniques. Id Because little trading has occurred, it is
apparent that a comparable performance standard would have had much the same effect, stimu-
lating a competitive marketto deliver conventional technologies, scrubbers, and low sulfur coal.
We may see more innovation in the second phase when stricter limits apply. Id. at 22.
143. See Driesen, supra note 80, at 57; Swift, supra note 134, at 22 (noting that prices
were originally estimated at $750 per ton, dropped below $100 per ton in 1996, and reached
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nism for lowering costs." In fact, few trades occurred in the program's first
years.'45 Studies comparing the actual compliance costs of traditional regula-
tion to pre-regulation estimates regularly show that regulators and industry
greatly overestimate costs.'46 Hence, the low cost of sulfur dioxide control
relative to estimates at the time Congress adopted the acid rain program may
reflect a common feature of all regulation rather than some unique attribute
of emissions trading.47
4. The Dichotomy as an Impediment to Learning Lessons From
the History of Emissions Trading
In summary, emissions trading has a theoretical claim to increased
efficiency. Because it lacks geographic specificity, emissions trading poses
significant threats to enforcement regimes. Emissions trading may have
caused significant cost savings, because it often allowed evasion of compli-
ance obligations.'48 It has generated adequate environmental performance
only when coupled with good monitoring and rules preventing gaming.
$110 per ton during 1997).
144. See Driesen, supra note 80, at 57.
145. See Swift, supra note 134, at 21 (estimating that as of March 1995 only one to three
and one half percent of allowances were involved in real inter-utility trades). The lack of
trading has occurred in other programs. See Kerr, supra note 101, at 65. Trading may increase
as compliance deadlines for meeting fairly stringent "phase two" controls near. Indeed, trading
increased in 1997. See EPA, Cumulative Allowances Transferred Under the Acid Rain
Program (last modified Jan. 28, 1998) <http:llwww.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/cumtrans.html>.
146. See THOMASO.MCGARITYRENvENTiNGRATIONALITY: THEROLEOFREGULATORY
ANALYSIs INTHEFEDERALBUREAUCRACY 131 (1991) ("Not surprisingly, retrospective studies
reveal a pattern of consistent before-the-fact overestimation of compliance costs."); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 10 ("Ina good number of cases... the actual cost
burden" of compliance "proved to be considerably less than OSHA had estimated."); Driesen,
supra note 21, at 600-01 & n.241; Eban Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted Data: Overesti-
mating Environmental Costs, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 64 (noting that
compliance costs are generally overestimated by over 100%).
147. See generally JuAN PABLO MONTERO, OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A PHASE-IN EMISSIONs
TRADINGPROGRAM WITH VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OPTIONS (1997); Markets andManagement
Utilities: Complying with Fed Air Rules Saves $$ - Study, AM. POL. NETWORK GREENWIRE,
Nov. 15, 1995, at 5. The General Accounting Office found that utilities have been reducing
their compliance costs without much trading. Eileen L. Kahaner, Note, GAO 'sAnalysis ofTitle
IV's Sulfur Dioxide EmissionsAllowance Trading Program, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 239, 244 (1995).
Competition among vendors has lowered the price of "traditional compliance options like" the
use of low sulfur fuels and scrubbing. Id. These same techniques can be used to meet a
performance standard without trading, and a performance standard would also tend to foster
competition to sell technologies and materials needed to meet the standard. See Driesen, supra
note 21, at 614-16.
148. See LIROFF, supra note 41, at 99 ("[C]ost saving approaches are not necessarily more
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EPA has not learned enough from the acid rain program's success and
prior programs' failures. In the 1990s, EPA has failed to prohibit 1980s-style
trading-tradingwith inadequatemonitoringandrulesthatallowpapercredits-
outside of the acid rain context.149 The economic incentives/command and
control dichotomy may partially account for this conspicuous failure to apply
the lessons of almost two decades of experience.' That experience teaches
cost-effective ways of meeting a goal; instead, they may be ways to avoid costs that may be
necessary to meet the goal."); Doniger, supra note 127, at 34 ("In practice... there has been
far more innovation in shell games and sharp accounting practices than in pollution control
technology."); Liroff, supra note 127, at30 (stating that compliance method that relaxes regula-
tory requirements at some points without compensating reductions may be more prevalent than
bubbles that reduce actual emissions); Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors,
60 Fed. Reg. 39,668, 39,670 (1995) (proposed Aug. 3, 1995) ("Bubbles, netting and offsets
have reduced sources' overall compliance costs. However, there have been significant problems
of quality control, reducing the environmental effectiveness of the programs.").
149. See Dunstan McNichol & Kelly Richmond, Pollution and PR, AMICUs ., Spring
1997, at 37 (describing bubbles that permit increased pollution). EPA recognizes that allowing
sources with actual emissions below allowable emissions, an extremely common occurrence,
to use the difference as a credit can cause increases in emissions. See Economic Incentive
Program Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,690, 16,698 (1994) (codified at40 C.F.R. § 51.490-.494). The
credits justify escape from regulatory requirements even though no actual reductions occur.
This was one of the major sources of paper credits in the bubbles of the early 1980s. Yet,
EPA's 1994 rule governing state economic incentive programs continued to authorize states to
use allowable emissions baselines in most situations. See id. at 16,697.
EPA also declined to establish strict minimum monitoring standards. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.493(e)(2) (1997). Instead, it simply required states to describe how they planned to
determine emission credits. See Economic Incentive Program Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. at 16,698-
707. EPA specifically rejected a state comment that emissions trading should be limited to
those source categories that could be monitored reliably. See id.
EPA also declined to bar claiming credits for shutdowns and slowdowns in production,
even for programs that do not cap overall emissions, another prominent source of unearned
credits that harmed performance of early 1980s bubbles. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.493(d)(3) (1997);
LIROFF, supra note 41, at 89-90; cf American Mun. Power Ohio v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1372, 1372-
76 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA interpretation of acid rain provisions to limit shutdown
credits to preserve integrity of cap in program). The author represented the Natural Resources
Defense Counsel in regulatory proceedings leading to the promulgation ofthe emissions trading
rule.
150. Professors Ackerman and Stewart have argued that marketable permit schemes should
provide added incentives to improve emissions monitoring. See Ackerman and Stewart, supra
note 6, at 183. The arguments Ackerman and Stewart made at that time do not apply to all
marketable permit schemes, do not seem fully persuasive for the schemes to which they apply,
and require testing in light of subsequent experience. EPA has continued to encourage bubbles
and other forms of emissions trading under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act's
nonattainment provisions. See Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey ofthe Impact ofReregu-
lation andDeregulation on SelectedIndustries andSectors, 47ADMIN.L. REv. 461,491 (1995)
(discussing Clinton administration's expansion of trading as part of its effort to "reinvent
government"). In spite of Congressional mandates to enhance emissions monitoring by 1992,
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that a program that requires continuous emissions monitoring and caps emis-
sions may well succeed, but that a program that does not adequately monitor
pollution and prevent gaming usually fails.
If "economic incentives" are good and "command and control" is bad,
then it makes sense to apply emissions trading widely and displace nearly all
"command and control" regulation.' The simple dichotomy supports contin-
uing application of emissions trading regimes, even to poorly monitored
pollutants. The dichotomy also supports writing rules that fail to prohibit
gaming."' This will stimulate the maximum expansion of the market by
EPA has not used this authority to force major improvements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3)
(1994);Agency Wants Extensionfor CAMRule UntilLate This Summer, Official Says, 28 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 305,305 (June 13, 1997) (explaining that EPA has decided notto require continu-
ous emissions monitoring); George Van Cleve & Keith W. Holman, Promise andReality in the
Enforcement ofthe Amended CleanAirActPartI: EPA 's "Any Credible Evidence" and "Com-
pliance Assurance Monitoring" Rules, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,097, 10,108-12
(Mar. 1997) (describing EPA's proposed abandonment of improving emissions monitoring in
favor of monitoring operation of control devices).
In contrast, Congress did mandate continuous emissions monitoring in the acid rain
program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651a(7), 7651k(a) (1994). This may show that EPA has difficulty
establishing monitoring standards because of vigorous opposition from industry, which will
profit from having insufficient monitoring. Public pressure on Congress may help remedy this
problem when Congress adopts emissions trading schemes.
Professors Ackerman and Stewart's rationale actually only applies to emissions trading
programs that auction off allowances, rather than give them away free. Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 6, at 183. They argue that if EPA must depend on auction revenue, it will have an
interest in making allowances scarce and prices high by making sure that good monitoring
applies to sources of emission reduction credits. Id Professors Ackerman and Stewart do not
consider the possibility that EPA can simply auction off additional allowances if the price
becomes too cheap, thus authorizing more pollution in order to solve its fiscal problems. In
addition, evidence unavailable at the time they wrote suggests, rather surprisingly, that the
bureaucracies are reluctant to adequately fund their programs by charging sufficient fees for
permits authorizing pollution. EPA has interpreted a Clean Air Act provision requiring a fee
for each ton of pollution permitted very narrowly in order to minimize fees and avoid conflicts
with industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3) (1994) (requiring fees adequate to cover all
reasonable costs of permit program, not less than $25.00 per ton); 40 C.F.R. § 70.9(b)(2) (1997)
(interpreting statutory provision to create presumption that $25.00 per ton is adequate and
creating exceptions to $25.00 per ton requirement). The states generally have not exercised
their authority to make sure that fees are sufficient to adequately fund their pollution control
work.
151. See Dennis, supra note 133, at 1137-38 (discussing tension between goal of stimulat-
ing markets to reduce emissions and clean air).
152. See EconomicIncentiveProgramRules, 59Fed. Reg. 16,690,16,707(1994) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 51.490-.494) (rejecting strict monitoring requirements because they would
restrict number of sources potentially subject to trading rules); Jo ANNE H. APLET, NOx/SOx
RECLAIM IMPLE ENTATION 17-18 (1995) (discussing Citizens for Better Environment's
allegations that California's new emissions trading program increases emissions).
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making cheap credits reflecting no real improvement available, even though
it will undermine environmental quality.'53 A recognition that emissions
trading is a tool that only works properly for well monitored pollutants and
rules requiring sufficient actual emission reductions would limit the scope of
trading programs and require strict rules ensuring the integrity of the programs
enacted. If proponents of emissions trading are correct in asserting that
emissions trading will succeed because of stimulated innovation or wide
divergence in compliance costs between sources, then a market can thrive with
rules prohibiting all potential opportunities to claim credits without undertak-
ing fresh pollution reductions and only allowing trades where strict monitor-
ing exists.
Apparently, emissions trading has not caused significant innovation.
Even the lead phase-down owes the substantial changes it induced not to
emissions trading, but to the stringency of its underlying limitations. The
failure of emissions trading to cause significant innovation calls into question
the adequacy of the command and control/economic incentive dichotomy."
If economic incentive programs, in contrast to command and control regula-
tion, provide superior incentives for innovation, then one might have expected
emissions trading to result in widespread innovation.
The lack of innovation in response to the emissions trading regime also
raises the question whether emissions trading programs really are economic
incentive programs. A clear theory of economic incentives may help in
designing programs that will provide adequate incentives to motivate innova-
tion and continuous reduction of pollution.
III Defining Economic Incentives and Understanding Emissions Trading
This Part asks whether emissions trading relies upon economic incentives
to a greater extent than traditional regulation. The possibility of a negative
answer reveals some theoretical limits to emissions trading as a spur to inno-
vation and continuous improvement.
A. A Broad Preliminary Definition of Economic Incentives
Many scholars advocate increased reliance upon economic incentives to
achieve environmental goals. But what precisely is an economic incentive?
153. See, e.g.,APLEr, supra note 152, at 12-13; SOUTHCOASTAiRQUALITYMANAGEMENT
DisTRIcr, SECOND ANNUAL RECLAIM PROGRAMAUDITREPORT 8 (1997) (unpublished report)
(on file with author) (recording high volume trading and emissions increase in first years of
program).
154. See Derzko, supra note 74, at 50 (noting that there has been "virtually no" empirical
testing of market based systems' "dynamic efficiency," but just theoretical modeling).
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What distinguishes reliance upon economic incentives from reliance upon
traditional regulation to meet environmental goals?
An economic incentive program can be defined as any program that
provides an economic benefit for pollution reductions or an economic penalty
for pollution. Defining economic incentives to include both positive and
negative incentives includes pollution taxes in the definition.'55 Does com-
mand and control regulation qualify as an economic incentive program under
this definition? Imagine a pure command and control law. The law com-
mands polluters to perform specific pollution reducing acts, but provides no
penalties for non-compliance. This law would probably motivate little or no
pollution reduction, because polluters could violate the commands without
consequence. 56 Command and control regulation only works when an en-
forcement mechanism exists.
57
Traditional regulation relies upon a negative economic incentive - a
monetary penalty for non-compliance- as the principle inducementto comply
with regulatory requirements, true command and control requirements, such
as work practice standards, and the more common performance standards. 58
Indeed, a traditional regulation's success depends heavily upon the adequacy
of these monetary penalties.,59
A formal definition of an economic incentive program as any program
relying on positive or negative economic inducements to secure pollution
reductions plausibly applies tojust about any regulatory program. To evaluate
possible explanations for the dichotomy's assumption that emissions trading
relies on economic incentives, but traditional regulation does not, a functional
analysis is helpful. Parties to this debate need to analyze whether emissions
trading overcomes traditional regulation's weaknesses in spurring innovation
and providing continuous incentives. This will require examination of the
sources of economic inducements, the financing mechanisms, the likely
responses of regulated polluters (both strategic and desired), and the govern-
155. See FREDERiCK R ANDERSON ET AL., ENviRONMENTAL IMROvEmENT THROUGH
ECONOMIC INCENTIvEs 18 (1977).
156. See Kerr, supra note 101, at 69-70.
157. Nicolas M. Kublicki, The Paper Triangle: National Forest Timber, Solid Waste
Disposal andRecycling, 7 TUL.ENVTL.L.J. 1, 37 (1993); Mark A. Stach, The Gradual Reform
ofEnvironmental Law in the Twenty-First Century: Opportunities Within a Familiar Frame-
work, 22 J. CORP. L. 621, 624-25 (1997).
158. See, e.g., James Miskiewicz& John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the
CleanAirAct afterthe 1990Amendments, 9 PACEENT. L. REV. 281,352-64,373-75 (1992)
(describing monetary penalties in Clean Air Act).
159. See id at 359 n.298 (stating that Congress intended that 1990 Clean Air Act amend-
ments would ensure that violators not obtain economic benefits from non-compliance).
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mental role in emissions trading. These questions provide the tools to develop
a functional theory of economic incentives.
B. Economic Incentives and Emissions Trading
Because traditional regulation's dependence upon government decisions
about emission limitations provides inadequate continuing incentives for
innovation, the theory of economic incentives might focus on reducing reli-
ance upon difficult government decisions. Because emissions trading de-
pends upon government established emission limitations it may not provide
incentives for continuous environmental improvement or innovation.
1. The Lack of Incentives for Continuous Improvement in
Emissions Trading
Recall that traditional regulation failed to provide an incentive for contin-
uous environmental improvement."6° Once a polluter complies with a tradi-
tional regulation (with an adequate cushion) no further incentive exists to
make more reductions unless doing so saves money. This subpart asks
whether emissions trading overcomes this problem.
A pure emissions trading model may help clarify the relationship be-
tween emissions trading, emission limitations, and incentives for continuous
pollution reductions. Imagine a law that allows any firm that reduces pollu-
tion to trade with any firm that increases pollution but fails to mandate emis-
sion reductions from particular pollution sources. This law would accom-
plish little. Without regulatory limits, firms would have no obligation to make
further reductions and no incentives to reduce emissions at all (or to trade).
An emissions trading program necessarily includes requirements for
specific reductions from pollution sources within the trading program and
allows sources to avoid the limits by trading with sources of credits."" This
means that some governmental body must set quantitative limits for specific
pollution sources.
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651 c(e) (table A) (1994) (establishing "phase one" allowances,
each constituting permission to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide). This feature of emissions
trading is notjust a peculiarity of the acid rain program, but rather a "necessary aspect" of "any"
allowance trading program. Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir.
1996); see also Stewart, supra note 30, at 1335 (citing initial allocation of permits as problem-
atic in transferrable system).
162. See Keohane et al., supra note 42, at3 (describing choice to pursue emissions trading
as "choice among the instruments" and issues of how to choose levels as separable issue);
Michael C. Naughton, Establishing Interstate Markets for Emissions Trading of Ozone
Precursors: The Case of the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission and the Northeast States
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Once a pollution source has complied with the underlying limits, no
further incentive exists to make additional reductions. The incentive to
provide reductions, either by making them at the source or purchasing credits
from elsewhere, continues throughout the compliance period defined by the
underlying regulations. The incentive's duration precisely matches that of a
traditional regulation with the same compliance period. Once the polluters
regulated by a trading program have reached an equilibrium providing the
reductions that the governmental body required, no incentive for further
reductions exists."
The acid raintrading program provides fairly long-term incentives because
it provides for staged reductions over a long period of time.' However,
Congress can couple long compliance times and ambitious staged reductions
with either traditional regulation or emissions trading. 6' The acid rain trading
program does not provide incentives to continue reducing net emissions after
an equilibrium is reached that matches the underlying reduction mandate.'
Some commentators argue that emissions trading provides a continuing
incentive to reduce "because the number ofpermits remain limited." 67 Hence,
economic growth will increase the demand for permits, raise the price, and
provide a greater incentive for polluters to reduce their emissions. 6'
Limiting the number of permits does not create an incentive for continu-
ous net emission reductions below the equilibrium level required by the pro-
gram. The limit creates an incentive for permit holders to reduce emissions
only to the extent that others will increase emissions. Net emissions would
remain consistentwith those authorized bythe promulgated emission limits. 69
for CoordinatedAir Use Management Emissions TradingProposals, 3 N.Y.U.ENvTL.L.J. 195,
202 (1994); Tripp & Dudek, supra note 83, at 374-76; cf GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TRANSITION SERIES: ENVIRONmENTAL PROTECTION ISSUES 10 (1992) (incorrectly describing
emissions trading as "nonregulatory alternative").
163. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 8-9 & n.33 (emissions trading tends to reach
equilibrium).
164. See Van Dyke, supra note 132, at 2709-10 (detailing compliance deadlines).
165. Long compliance deadlines may bejustified when the reduction demanded cannot be
implemented in a shorter time period and less justified if the reductions demanded can be
produced fairly quickly.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(a). This subsection caps emissions, with some exceptions, at
8.9 million tons of sulfur dioxide a year. It does not provide for reductions below that level.
Id. It provides for pro-rata reductions in allowances for some sources, but only to the extent
needed to meet this 8.9 million ton cap. Id. Hence, once the sources have the appropriate
aggregate total of emissions, no incentive exists for further net reductions.
167. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 83, at 374.
168. Ia
169. See Stewart, supra note 85, at 13 ("Given afixed supply of permits... [t]he system
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A legal rule limiting the number of permits creates incentives to avoid
increases above the mandated level, whether or not the permits can be traded.
The premise that a trading program limits the number of permits tacitly
assumes that a legal rule prohibits the sources of additional pollution caused
by economic growth from operating without purchased emission allow-
ances. 70 The argument that a trading program restrains growth in emissions
from economic growth also requires an assumption that the trading regime
imposes a cap on the mass of emissions of the sources within a trading pro-
gram (as in the acid rain program). A program authorizing trading to meet
rate-based emission limitations or allowing any pollution source to operate
without purchased allowances would tolerate increases in emissions associ-
ated with economic growth without demanding compensating credits. 7 ' Thus,
even the modest argument that trading can restrain growth in emissions
applies only to a particular idealized trading program, not emissions trading
in general.
A traditional regulatory program that prohibits economic growth from
creating additional emissions would, in theory, also provide a continuing
will ensure that we... keep in place.").
170. Tripp & Dudek, supra note 83, at 375. This may be quite a heroic assumption,
because adopting and enforcing a prohibition on all pollution may prove difficult politically.
The Clean Air Act does not currently contain such a prohibition. The Clean Water Act does
contain a general prohibition on non-permitted discharges. See EPA v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976) (stating that Clean Air Act prohibits discharge of
pollutants without permit); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1,
7 (1976) (same); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C. Cir.
1977); cf Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1992) (noting that EPA may permit
discharges into water bodies violating existing water quality standards). The courts and EPA
have not always faithfully implemented the prohibition of non-permitted discharges. See
Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that discharges of pollutants not listed in permit is permissible); Joanna Bowen,
Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Co.: The Second Circuit Affirms the
NPDESPermit as a Shield and Tries to Sink the Clean WaterAct, 12 PACEENVTL. L. REv. 269,
271 (1994) (arguing that court interpreted Act more narrowly than EPA, which believes that
pollutants not listed in permit application cannot be discharged); cf Northwest Envtl. Advocates
v. Portland, 52 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that citizens may sue to enforce water
quality conditions in permits, not just effluent limitations). See generally Michael D. Axline
& Patrick C. McGinley, Universal Statutes & Planetary Programs: How EPA Has Diluted the
Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 253 (1993).
171. See Swift, supra note 134, at 18 (explaining that emision rates do not necessar-
ily prevent increases in mass of emissions). Traditional regulations can limit pollution by
mass rather than by rate. Hence, traditional regulation and emissions trading based on rates fail
to constrain emissions in the face of growth in production, but limits on mass, whether ex-
pressed in performance standards or tradable allowances, may constrain emissions in the face
of growth.
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incentive to avoid net emission increases in response to economic growth.'72
A legal rule prohibiting all non-permitted emissions would improve the
environmental performance of either an emissions trading scheme or tradi-
tional regulation. Even an idealized emissions trading program does not pro-
vide a more continuous incentive for pollution reduction than a comparable
traditional regulation.
2. Complexity, Uncertainty, and Delay in Emissions Trading
Recall that problems of complexity, uncertainty, and delay prevented
traditional regulatory programs from predictably tightening limits. These
problems limited traditional regulation's ability to stimulate innovation.173
This section considers whether emissions trading overcomes these prob-
lems. '74
If an administrative body sets the limits underlying a trading program,
then the problems of the complexity of administrative environmental decision
making and the attendant delay may infect these decisions, just as they infect
decision making in traditional programs." The resulting uncertainty can
lessen incentives to innovatejust as uncertainty about future emission limita-
tions reduces such incentives in traditional regulation. 176 Further, just as
172. The traditional program would simply duplicate the assumptions implicit in the
trading model Tripp and Dudek tacitly advance. See generally Tripp & Dudek, supra note 83.
The government would set mass based emission limitations for pollution sources, something
that must occur in the trading program as well. The same background legal rule would apply
prohibiting the government from granting permits to new sources of emissions.
173. Professor Stewart cites uncertainty about the timing of emissions control decisions
as a factor discouraging innovation. Stewart, supra note 30, at 1271-72, 1315-16.
174. Proponents of emissions trading have argued that emissions trading will simplify
administration. See DALES, supra note 1, at 97 (comparing continuously monitored effluent
trading not to uniform standard setting, but to case-by-case permitting).
175. See Latin, supra note 59, at 1290 (noting that to extent market incentive programs can
be adjusted flexibly to respond to new information, they present same "moving target" effect as
command and control regulation). See generally CED, supra note 87, at 42 (noting complexity
of administration and operation of emissions trading).
176. See Dennis, supra note 133, at 1105 (noting that if need for reduction in acid rain
becomes more urgent, allowances might be confiscated, thus upsetting the market); Kerr, supra
note 101, at 6 (noting that because of high levels of scientific uncertainty and changing
preferences regulatory systems must periodically readjust targets). Professor Stewart envisions
"depreciating permits" over time according to a predetermined schedule. See Stewart, supra
note 30, at 1333. Professor Stewart suggests that this proposal would obviate the need for
"constant administrative or legislative tightening." Id. at 1332-33.
Emissions trading schemes that do not have a fixed long-term depreciation schedule still
may require periodic tightening. A long term depreciation schedule can be applied to either
marketable or unmarketable permits. Hence, whatever certainty this idea might create would
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traditional regulation uses technological, cost-benefit, or health-based criteria
to set limitations, the same criteria can be used to set the limitations governing
trading programs.'77 Also, private parties have significant incentives to
litigate disliked stringency determinations and allocative decisions."'
Congressional mandates of specific emission reductions may circumvent
some of the problems with administrative decision making, including hard
look judicial review.'79 Congress has, in fact, tried to circumvent administra-
tive problems by mandating specific cuts of named pollutants through central-
ized emissions trading, 8 ° decentralized standard setting,' and centralized
standard setting." The scarcity of congressional time may limit the fre-
quency of congressional mandates.' However, congressionally set limits
have often fared relatively well and should be pursued.' Congressional
limits may provide more democratic accountability than comparable adminis-
exist with or without emissions trading. Professor Stewart's proposal may make sense. How-
ever, his argument is not really an argument about emissions trading.
177. For example, California's RECLAIM program allows adjustment of reduction
allocations based on technology reviews. These reviews assume that the facilities should reduce
their emissions to levels equivalent to those under the traditional regulations RECLAIM
replaced. SOUTH COASTAIRQUALITYMANAGEMENTDISTRICT, supra note 153, at 19-20. The
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) has allocated additional emission
allowances, thereby harming air quality, when it concluded that a facility could not meet its
target through locally applied technology known to the SCAQMD. Id. at 72-73.
178. See Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858,861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving
claim seeking additional emission allowances); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 58
F.3d 643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 25 F.3d 526, 526 (7th Cir.
1994) (same); Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.2d 272,272-74 (4th Cir. 1992) (same);
Thompson, supra note 5, at 1359 (noting that "bureaucrats would face tremendous special
interest pressure" when they allocate emission allowances "because of the importance and
monetary value of these rights").
179. See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case ofthe Clean Air
Act, 30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 808, 815 (1983). Professors Stewart and Ackerman seem to have
Congressionally set limits in mind. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 6, at 190.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 765 1(b) (1994) (setting goal of acid rain trading program to cut sulfur
dioxide by ten million tons).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 a(b)(1) (1994) (generallyrequiring states to cut volatile organic
compounds by 15% from 1990 levels).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(g) (1994) (setting numerical standards for motor vehicles).
183. See Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21
ENVTL. L. 1721, 1721-42 (1991) (explaining political forces that delayed amendment of Clean
Air Act until 1990).
184. See Driesen, supra note 80, at 53-55. This author has argued elswhere that successful
implementation usually follows great specificity in Congressional decision making. Id at 54-55.
Generally, statutory provisions that require major decisions from EPA or the states fare less
well.
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trative decisions, since the electorate can hold Congress more accountable for
the results. 85 Yet the advantages of specific quantitative congressional
decision making occur whether or not pollution sources may use trading as a
means to comply with the limits.
In addition to the usual issues that arise in a traditional regulation, such
as how costly reductions will be, how much benefit they will yield, and
whether they are technologically achievable, arcane disputes arise about
baseline emission levels, creditable reductions and the like in emissions
trading programs. 86 Sources subject to trading have economic incentives to
seek rules establishing the cheapest possible method of complying with a
185. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 6, at 189. Professors Ackerman and Stewart
have argued that emissions trading tends to foster democratic decision making by focusing
attention on issues people can more easily understand, such as the amount of emissions to cut,
and avoiding arcane questions that only technocrats can understand. Id- With a little work,
citizens can understand whether an EPA or state regulation will force a factory in their neigh-
borhood to meet emission limitations, including technology-based limitations, that similar
factories meet elsewhere, or that can be met with known technology. Understanding the myriad
potential games that can be accomplished through emissions trading requires expertise that very
few possess. Hence, it seems odd to defend emissions trading as a democratizing reform. Cf
Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 300, 324-25
(1995) (arguing that acid rain program did not achieve democratizing goal).
186. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 83, at 370-71 (explaining that designing and imple-
menting emissions trading is technically complex); see also Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA,
89 F.3d 858, 867-75 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA's use of State-wide average baseline
emission rate as basis for calculating emission allowances, its analysis of that data, and its
decision regarding adjustment of allowances to account for prolonged outages during baseline
period); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d 643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting
claims to adjustment of allowances based on power outages during period used to establish
baseline emissions); Letter from Natural Resources Defense Council to Michael Shapiro,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency, Providing
Comments on Economic Incentive Program Rules and Related Guidance (June 13, 1993) (on
file with author). EPA has a greater understanding of electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide
than it does of most emissions. Hence, one would expect even more disputes in most other
contexts. See LIRoFF, supra note 41, at 15-16.
Some emissions trading proponents seekto minimize the importance ofthese issues by dis-
missing them as "transitional" issues. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 6, at 185. Because
most responsible proponents recognize that emissions trading cannot wholly supplanttraditional
regulation, issues regarding their interaction are likely to be with us for a long time. See
BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 190 ("[T]he ideal policy package contains a mixture of
instruments, with taxes, marketable permits, [and] direct control.., each used in certain cir-
cumstances to regulate the sources of environmental damage."); DALES, supra note 1, at 98 (con-
tending that emissions trading is impracticable for "diffuse" pollution); Hahn & Stavins, supra
note 5, at 15 ("The best set of policies will typically involve a mix of market and more conven-
tional regulatory processes."). Professors Ackerman and Stewart do not really explain why the
issues complicating emissions trading would disappear overtime. While these issues might be
resolved appropriately given sufficient political will, it's hard to imagine their disappearance.
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trading program."8 7 The cheapest mdethods involve claiming compliance
without doing anything at all to reduce emissions. For example, a participant
might claim compliance by claiming credits for reductions that already
occurred or for reductions that can occur through normal events in the busi-
ness cycle, such as production declines and plant shutdowns without accepting
debits for other normal events.' Demands to write rules that allow evasion
of actual emission reductions can consume regulators designing programs,
increase uncertainty, and delay progress. 9
Efforts to establish an international trading regime for greenhouse gases,
for example, may generate fresh evasion problems. United States utilities
would like to claim credit for activities abroad in order to justify avoiding
potential limits on their greenhouse gas emissions at home.' They may have
incentives to claim credits for their role in projects that increase worldwide
CO2 emissions, principally construction of new coal burning power plants.
Unless the underlying emissions trading rules prohibit this explicitly, they
may claim a credit representing the difference between the project built and
a dirtier project that could have been built if less modem equipment was used.
Of course, industry has no interest in seeking rules that assign it debits for
selling equipment that raises CO2 emissions above current levels. Debits
would increase their emissions control obligations and compliance costs.
Utilities also have an economic incentive to seek credits for helping
forest protection efforts abroad. If the government allows them to substitute
credits for inexpensive forestry projects for more expensive pollution control
efforts, they will save money. Since forests do sequester carbon emissions
that would otherwise warm the atmosphere this seems sensible at first
glance.' 9' But will the protection of any given forest have any effect on global
carbon levels? If demand simply shifts to other unprotected forests then the
protection effort may not decrease net deforestation at all. Rather, the protec-
tion effort may protect one area while channeling more deforestation into
187. See, e.g., Letter from Gail Ruderman Feuer, Natural Resources Defense Council
Senior Staff Attorney, to Henry W. Wedaa, Chairman, South Coast Air Quality Management
District (Sept. 9, 1993) (on file with author).
188. See American Mun. Power- Ohio v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1372, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(rejecting creation of shutdown credits that would impede realization of pollution reductions);
APLET, supra note 152, at 6-7, 12-13 (noting that shutdown credits used under California rules).
189. See APLET, supra note 152, at 20-22 (noting that California's RECLAIM program has
produced no actual emission reductions and has introduced substantial uncertainty about
realizing reductions below those required by 1991 technology-based limits).
190. See Electric Utilities SeeMajorDifficulties inEstablishingGlobal Emissions Trading,
28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 368, 368 (June 20, 1997).
191. See CLIMATECHANGE 1995: THESCIENCEoF CLIMATECHANGE, supra note 9, at 449.
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areas open to logging. Hence, emissions trading may provide incentives not
just to make reductions elsewhere, but to claim credits for other activities that
do not have comparable value.
Increased reliance on emissions trading may create a fresh incentive to
resist emission limitations.192 Polluters may want to avoid regulation of
pollution sources they own in order to protect potential sources of future
credits. Thus, emissions trading will offer less of an incentive for continuous
improvement (i.e. beginning before and continuing after compliance deadlines
in the regulation) than comparable traditional regulation.19 Emissions trad-
ing, rather than providing an antidote to the problems of complex decision
making that plague traditional regulation, provides a layer of additional
complications and occasions for dispute.19
Emissions trading will contribute to quicker realization of environmental
goals if regulators make the underlying emissions limitations more stringent
than comparable traditional regulation. If emissions trading generates large
cost savings, as proponents claim, program designers can demand more
emission reductions than they could under a traditional regulation and still
save polluters money.
Typically, cost considerations constrain the stringency of environmental
regulation.'95 Ifthe sources with high marginal control costs need not pay that
cost because they can pay facilities with lower marginal costs to reduce in
their stead, then there is no justification for a standard driven by the high
marginal costs of the polluters with high local costs or even by their tech-
nological inability to meet the standard at the source. 9 6 An agency could
allow pollution sources sufficient cost savings to motivate trading, but use the
rest of the savings to pay for more stringent regulation.'97 For example,
192. See Hanley et al., supra note 94, at 1431 ("[I]t may be more difficult with tax or
permit systems to force individual polluters to alter their discharges."); Dennis, supra note 133,
at 1122-24 (positing that experience suggests allocation ofpollution rights, even withouttakings
protection, may empower those with allowances to resist pollution reductions).
193. Cf LIROFF, supra note 41, at 137-38 (discounting similar argument).
194. See Meidinger, supra note 114, at 170.
195. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 180
(6th Cir. 1986) (noting that EPA has interpreted "reasonably available control technology" to
be "the lowest emission limitation that a particular source is capable of meeting by the applica-
tion of control technology that is reasonably available considering technological and economic
feasibility" (emphasis added)).
196. Cf National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 416-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (vacating
emission limits because EPA failed to demonstrate that all pollution sources in category could
meet them).
197. See Letter from Natural Resources Defense Council to Michael Shapiro, supra note
186, at 4-5. Indeed, existing environmental statutes may legally require this procedure when
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assume that one pollution source, Seller, faces control costs of $1,000 per ton
and another, Buyer, faces costs of $3,000 per ton. A uniform forty ton reduc-
tion requirement would cost $160,000.' Seeking the same aggregate eighty
ton reduction through emissions trading would cost $80,000 if Seller made all
the reductions. The regulator could, however, require a 120 ton reduction,
costing $120,000, through emissions trading and still generate a $40,000 cost
savings'99 relative to the eighty ton reduction required through traditional
regulation. Using cost savings to increase stringency in this manner could
speed achievement of environmental goals, but emissions trading without this
feature does nothing to overcome delay.
3. The Tension Between Efficient Spatial Flexibility and Creating
Incentives for Innovation
Recall that traditional regulation mandates emission reductions from
specific pollution sources.2° This section asks whether the spatial flexibility
that emissions trading offers provides superior incentives for innovation.
An emissions trading program relies upon not just the same decision-
making processes as traditional regulation, but also the same negative eco-
nomic incentive that traditional regulation uses; the prospect of a monetary
penalty for non-compliance.2"1 A pollution source may comply by either
reducing emissions locally or purchasing credit.0 2 If the source fails to do
either, it risks a financial penalty.
trading is adopted administrativelyunderexisting environmental statutes. See42U.S.C. §7412(d)
(1994) (requiring maximum achievable emission reductions); 751 l(a)(1) (requiring attainment
of air quality standards as expeditiously as practicable). If EPA can legally define provisions
requiring "such reductions from existing sources.., as may be obtained through adoption, at
aminimum, ofreasonably available control technology" (RACT) to authorize emissions trading,
which is an open question, then emissions trading will make control options at one facility
reasonably available to another. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (1994). Thus, RACT regulations
predicated on emissions trading should be more stringent than a traditional regulation.
198. (40 x $1,000) + (40 x $3,000) = $160,000.
199. $160,000 - $120,000 = $40,000.
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (1994).
202. For example, the acid rain provisions, with limited exceptions, penalize operators who
emit sulfur dioxide in excess of the number of held allowances. See 42 U.S.C. § 76510). The
provisions assign each unit included in the program an emissions limitation expressed as an
allowance and the pollution source can reduce to that level without trading. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 765la(3) (defining allowance as permission to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide); 42 U.S.C.
7651c (allocating allowances). Alternatively, the pollution source can purchase allowances
from another source and use this as a credit to justify less than full local compliance. See 42
U.S.C. § 765lb(b).
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Atrading program's ability to motivate innovation and good environmen-
tal performance depends on at least three factors: (1) the stringency of the
emission limitations governing pollution sources; (2) the size of possible
monetary penalties; and (3) the likelihood that the government or citizens will
catch non-complying polluters.2 3 If regulators use emissions trading as a
means of providing the same total emission reductions as a traditional pro-
gram, emissions trading may provide less potentnegative economic incentives
to reduce pollution than a comparable traditional regulation, because the
emission reduction obligation and monetary penalties may remain the same
while evading regulatory obligations becomes easier.
It is easier for polluters to evade regulatory obligations when the com-
plexity of enforcement increases, thereby decreasing the chances that a
government enforcer will have time to detect failures to provide contemplated
real reductions. Emissions trading requires an enforcer wishing to determine
whether a buyer of emissions credits has satisfied an obligation to verify the
amount of reductions foregone at the buyer's plant (which requires knowledge
of current and baseline emissions from the uncontrolled source) and to evalu-
ate whether the claimed reductions occurred at the source of the credits. The
enforcer must run numerous other checks to make sure that no double count-
ing or other gaming is going on.2 Hence, agencies relying upon trading need
more resources to verify compliance than agencies relying upon traditional
regulation. °"
Evasion of real emission reductions is easier in programs that do not
require strict monitoring of pollution from all potential sources of credits and
debits. Facilities subject to an emissions trading regime without adequate
monitoring may pollute more than the law permits, because no monitoring
detects the exceedances, just as in traditional regulation. Moreover, these
undetected noncompliant facilities may claim emission credits for emitting
less than the standard requires. The sale of these credits will justify increased
pollution at a second facility. Hence, inadequate monitoring may prove twice
203. See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES
103-05 (1995); Robert L. Hahn & Robert L. Axtell, Reevaluating the Relationship Between
Transferable Property Rights and Command-and-Control Regulation, 8 J. REG. ECoN. 125,
127-28 (1995); see also Richard E. Ayers, Enforcement ofAir Pollution Controls on Stationary
Sources Under the CleanAirAmendments of1970, 4 ECOLOGYL.Q. 441,470 (1975) (asserting
that fewer issues of fact in enforcement action imply less likelihood of industry risking noncom-
pliance).
204. Double counting occurs when two pollution sources rely on the same reduction for
a credit or when one pollution source relies on actions taken to fulfill one regulatory require-
ment to satisfy a requirement that otherwise would have generated an additional reduction. See
LIROFF, supra note 41, at 15-16 (describing situation that amounts to double counting).
205. See Derzko, supra note 74, at 52 n.255.
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as detrimental in an emissions trading scheme because monitoring inadequa-
cies tend to permit increased emissions at one facility and simultaneously
justify a second increase at some other facility. This particular problem,
however, may not apply to emissions trading programs that feature accurate,
reliable monitoring.
The trading mechanism creates additional incentives for some polluters
within the trading program, specifically where large differences in marginal
control costs exist. It creates an economic incentive for polluters facing high
marginal control costs to increase emissions above the otherwise applicable
limit, at least to the extent that the high-cost polluters plans to purchase
relatively cheap credits from other sources."° It also creates an incentive for
polluters facing low marginal control costs to decrease emissions, at least to
the extent the polluter plans to sell credits to sources with high costs.0 7 If the
market functions smoothly, then trading occurs, the incentives cancel each
other out, and the net economic incentive mirrors that of a comparable tradi-
tional regulation (except for weakened enforcement's tendency to increase
emissions).
Because a well designed trading program may induce pollution sources
with low marginal control costs to go beyond regulatory limits to a greater
degree than they would under a traditional regulation, commentators focusing
only on the low-cost sources have argued that emissions trading creates
greater incentives for technological innovation than traditional regulation.0 8
As some economists have realized, this argument ignores the incentive for
high-cost sources to avoid pollution reduction activities.0 9 Trading reduces
the incentive for high-costs sources to apply new technology.
In theory, emissions trading probably weakens net incentives for innova-
tion.210 If a regulation allows facilities to use trading to meet standards, the
low-cost facilities tend to provide more of the total reductions than they would
provide under a comparable traditional regulation. Conversely, the high-cost
facilities will provide less of the total required reductions than they would
have under a comparable traditional regulation. The low-cost facilities prob-
ably have a greater ability to provide reductions without substantial innovation
than high-cost facilities. A high-cost facility may need to innovate to escape
the high costs of routine compliance; the low-cost facility does not have this
206. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 8 n.33.
207. Id. at 8-9 & n.33.
208. See David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New
Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 52, 54 (1987).
209. Id.
210. See generally id.
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same motivation. Hence, emissions trading, by shifting reductions from high-
cost to low-cost facilities, may lessen the incentives for innovation.
Some analysis of the Low Emissions Vehicle (LEV) program, a regula-
tory program that several states have enacted to stimulate innovation and
secure emissionreductions from automobiles, illustrates how emissions trading
may decrease incentives for innovation.2" The program requires the intro-
duction of a large number of vehicles that must meet emission standards
which car manufacturers can realize with fairly modest technological im-
provements, such as highly efficient catalysts.2 2 The program also requires
the introduction of a small number of Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEVs), most
likely electric cars.2" 3 The automobile industry claims that the ZEVs will be
expensive to produce.214 One could theoretically design a program providing
the same net emissions reductions as the LEV program by excluding the zero
emissions mandate and requiring a more widespread implementation of the
remaining requirements.2 5 In the short run this would theoretically produce
the same emission reductions for less cost. However, the zero emissions
mandate provides the incentive to develop new technologies that may revolu-
tionize the environmental performance of automobiles over time and even
lower long-term costs.216 Thus, there is a tradeoff between short-term effi-
ciency and the desire to promote technological innovation.
211. See CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g) (1998); Virginiav. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397,
1412 & n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts have
adopted LEV program), modified, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 79 F.3d 1298,1298 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding
New York LEV program); American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 31 F.3d 18, 18-19
(1st Cir. 1994) (upholding Massachusetts LEV program).
212. See Studies Will Examine Effects of Sulfur on Catalysts in Low Emission Vehicles,
28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 403, 403 (June 27, 1997).
213. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17
F.3d 521,528 (2d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of some of the technological issues concerning
electric vehicles, see JAMES J. MACKENZIE, THE KEYS TO THE CAR: ELECTRIC AND HYDROGEN
VEmCLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 21-73 (1994).
214. Air Pollution: Panel Will Consider Alternatives to LEV Plan for Northeast, EPA
Says, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 705, 705 (Aug. 12, 1994); Air Pollution: Quick Resolution Of
Clean-Carlssue Sought AutomakersAskRegulators ToAvoidZEVPlan, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA)
556, 556-57 (July 14, 1995).
215. In practice, one could not do so with integrity. Measurement of automobile emissions
is notoriously difficult, especially the "evaporative emissions." Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Barry
Needleman, Control ofAir Pollution From Mobile Sources Through Inspection and Mainte-
nance Programs, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 409, 420,445 (1993). ZEVs will virtually eliminate
evaporative emissions as well as tailpipe emissions. Ashley Morris Bale, The Newest in Motor
Vehicle Emission Control: The Clean Fuel Vehicle, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 262 (1996).
216. See generally MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, THE CAR THAT COULD: THE INSIDE STORY OF
GM's REVOLUTIONARY ELECTRIC VEHICLE (1996) (detailing innovations in automotive
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Another example of the way emissions trading lessens the motivation
to innovate is joint implementation, an international emissions trading pro-
gram, proposed as a means of meeting climate change goals.2"7 The United
States has sponsored pilot projects to demonstrate the feasibility of allowing
electric utilities, significant sources of greenhouse gases, to claim credits for
emissions reductions undertaken abroad as a substitute for being below
current levels at home. Ifthe United States imposed extremely strict domestic
reduction requirements upon electric utilities instead, the utilities might have
to employ innovative technologies, such as fuel cells and solar energy." 8
However,joint implementation may allow utilities to avoid these innovations.
Joint implementation may allow them to claim credit for upgrading a very
dirty plant abroad with off-the-shelf technology at very modest cost. These
credits might substitute for relatively expensive domestic investments in
innovative technologies to meet emission limitations at home.
Emissions trading advocates often cite the increased flexibility of emis-
sions trading as a reason to expect trading to generate more innovation than
comparable traditional regulation. It is unclear why increased spatial flexibil-
ity would increase innovation. Locational constraints may increase the need
for innovation by requiring focused pollution control efforts that might
become expensive absent innovation. By contrast, easing the spatial con-
straints of traditional regulation may make it easier to choose to deploy a well
understood control method at an emissions source that is cheaper to control,
rather than to encourage innovation.1 9
These observations are not meant to suggest that emissions trading is
bad. Lowering short-term costs is desirable. But, short-term savings do
not necessarily coincide with the encouragement of technological advance-
ment or long-term savings." Significant up-front investment and stringent
technical demands often play an important role in stimulating technological
advances.
C. Theoretical Lessons From Emissions Trading
Emissions trading, traditionally considered an "economic incentive"
program, may provide a less potent economic incentive to reduce pollution
technology and role of ZEV mandate in stimulating such innovations).
217. Remarks at the National Geographic Society, supra note 8.
218. See generally At Last, The Fuel Cell, ECONOMIsT, Oct. 25, 1997, at 89; Andrew C.
Revkin, Under Solar Bill, Homeowners Could Cut Electricity Cost to Zero, N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 1996, at B1.
219. See LIRorF, supra note 41, at 100 ("Most innovations under bubbles merely are
rearrangements of conventional technologies.").
220. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 567-71,614-16.
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and innovate than a comparable traditional regulation."1 An understanding of
the reasons for this may contribute to a theory that would help guide design
of better environmental programs. Analyzing a program's ability to provide
economic incentives for pollution reduction requires an evaluation of all
potentially relevant monetary flows. In simpler terms, "follow the money."
Emissions trading programs are often characterized as economic incen-
tives because they use positive economic inducements. The lower cost source
can increase revenue by reducing pollution below regulatory limits and selling
credits to the higher cost source. The money to provide a positive induce-
ment, however, must come from somewhere.
An emissions trading program produces no net incentive to do better than
traditional regulation in any way because emission increasesfinance emission
decreases. High-cost sources decrease costs by exceeding a regulatory limit.
The savings the high-cost source realizes by exceeding a regulatory limit on
pollution finance the low-cost source's "additional" pollution reductions.
The emissions trading example teaches that mimicking free market
features that do not coincide with desired policy outcomes proves counterpro-
ductive. Emissions trading programs, although they create no special net
incentives to reduce emissions, encourage trade in emission reduction credits.
As mentioned above, one can always motivate trading by allowing pollution
sources to avoid real reduction obligations by purchasing paper credits or
allowing poorly monitored emissions reduction claims to become creditable.
While this may create a robust market, it produces cost savings through
inferior performance.' A theory focusing on developing robust markets
leads to investment of scarce public resources in programs that fail to use
economic incentives to motivate at least equivalent environmental achieve-
ment at lower cost.
221. The analysis above pertains only to the incentives for pollution sources. Other
scholars have concluded that emissions trading also offers less incentives for the pollution
control industry to innovate than traditional regulation. See Derzko, supra note 74, at 54
(discussing desirability of environmental patents).
222. Proponents of emissions trading tend to regard robust trading, rather than realization
of emission reduction goals, as evidence of a successful emissions trading program. For
example, Hahn and Hester oppose requirements in the Clean Air Act that require new pollution
sources to acquire offsetting emission reductions at a ratio exceeding 1:1 in areas that have
unhealthy air quality. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 128, at 376-77. They characterize this
requirement as a "restriction on emissions trading," when it in fact requires more emissions
trading than would occur with less stringent ratios. Id. at 376. They rationalize this character-
ization by pointing outthat another loophole, netting, allows sourcesto escape the offset require-
ment altogether to the extent that the net emissions of a plant remain constant as a new unit is
added. Id. at 377. This possibility exists, however, because of the regulations allowing netting,
not because of the offset ratios. Similarly, Hahn and Hester identify the costs of verifying that
emission reduction credits reflect real emission reductions in a trading program as "transaction
costs" and then cite transaction costs as an impediment to trading. Id. at 377-78, 404.
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The emissions trading example reveals that the term "economic incen-
tive" has very little meaning if defined to include everything that relies on
some kind of monetary penalty or benefit. Indeed, to the extent the term
"economic incentive" should not apply to traditional regulation, it also should
not apply to emissions trading. Both types of programs rely on monetary
penalties to induce compliance with government set limits. Neither creates
incentives for sources to continuously realize net reductions substantially
surpassing the specifically mandated reductions.
The emissions trading example shows that one must carefully analyze
programs to see which free market-like advantages they might offer. While
emissions trading may have the capacity to use private sector compliance
resources efficiently, it may use government resources for program design and
enforcement inefficiently.
Emissions trading may provide no more incentive for continual improve-
ment or innovation than traditional regulation. Emissions trading does not
stimulate competition to maximize environmental performance. It simply
authorizes some trading around of obligations the government has created.
A theory of economic incentives aimed at continuous environmental
improvement and innovation needs more specificity than the command and
control/economic incentive dichotomy offers. The theory might aim to
approximate more carefully the dynamics that stimulate innovation in a free
market.
IV. True Economic Incentives
This Part develops a theory of true economic incentives as an alternative
to reliance upon repeated governmental decisions concerning the scale of
emission reductions. Emissions trading does not provide a meaningful alter-
native to traditional programs, because it relies upon government decisions
about the scale of reductions instead of decentralized responses to continuous
incentives to reduce pollution. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish true
economic incentive programs, programs that rely solely on positive and
negative economic inducements to secure reductions, from mixed programs
like emissions trading and traditional regulation, that rely on a combination
of negative economic inducements, in the form of monetary penalties for non-
compliance, and government commands.'
223. The free market economy already provides incentives to make pollution reductions
that reduce a firm's costs without government intervention. The government can help firms
realize these reductions by providing information that helps firms seize these opportunities. See
generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive EnvironmentalLaw, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227(1995) (advocat-
ing concept of environmental law based on this kind of approach). EPA's successful green
lights program provides an example of a government information program that helps firms seize
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This Part discusses economic incentive programs that use economic
incentives to overcome traditional regulation's weak stimulation of innovation
and continuous improvement. It discusses the classic economic incentive of
apollutiontax. 4 While this incentive does create an incentive for continuous
improvement, unlike emissions trading, it still relies largely on government
decision making, which may weaken the incentive's ability to stimulate
innovation. This Part also discusses the creation of more dynamic economic
incentives that rely upon private initiative, rather than government decision
making, to drive innovation.
A. Taxes
The government may tax pollution' to create an economic incentive to
reduce pollution. 6 In order for a tax to encourage innovation and superior
opportunities to reduce costs and pollution simultaneously. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The
ExpandedDebate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1463, 1512 n.246
(1996) (citing 'Green Lights' Pact Between U.S. Firms, EPA Could Cut Emissions by 235
Million Tons Annually, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1705, 1705 (1991) (noting that program as
example of voluntarism)); Comment, Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions to 1990 Levels by
the Year Two Thousand: WhatAre the Options and Can the United StatesAchieve This Reduc-
tion Without Disrupting the Economy, 3 DIcK. J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 79, 83 (1993) (describing
cost savings and associated emission reductions). EPA has persuaded numerous companies to
install energy efficient lighting, which indirectly reduces power plant emissions, by explaining
the long term savings in electricity costs. Joseph F. DiMento & Francesco Bertolini, Green
Management and the Regulatory Process: For Mother Earth, Market Share, and Modern Rule,
9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 121, 151 (1996) (stating that program has forged over one thousand
"corporate partnerships" to install energy efficient lighting in over 3.3 billion square feet of
office space over five years). Although the 'Green Lights' program does not create fresh
economic incentives, it does contribute to the effective use of existing economic incentives. See
Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1435, 1441 (1995).
224. Most of this discussion will focus on taxes because a proponent of subsidies would
have to face the objection that the polluter, not the taxpayer, should pay the cost of pollu-
tion control. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1322. In effect, the subsidy robs government
programs to finance a polluter's efforts to reduce emissions. This approach conflicts with the
traditional "polluter pays" principle at the heart of environmental law. See also BAUMOL &
OATES, supra note 95, at2l1-34 (discussing relative advantages oftaxes and subsidies); cf. Kirk
W. Junker, Tax Exemption for Pollution Control Devices in Pennsylvania, 34 DUQ. L. REv.
503, 512 (1996) (explaining state's use of tax exemption to encourage pollution abatement and
control). Subsidies for polluting activities raise important policy questions. See Barbara
Crossette, Subsidies Hurt Environment, Critics Say Before Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1997,
at A3.
225. The phrase "taxing pollution" describes an enormous number ofpossible applications.
Choosing the activity or pollutants to tax actually becomes a crucial issue in the design of
"pollution taxes." See generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 155, at 39-89.
226. See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLEORPENGUiNs: THE CASEFOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION
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environmental performance, it must have several characteristics. 7 First, the
tax must apply to activities of firms that already comply with all applicable
emission limitations, or that have no applicable limitations. Second, the tax
must exceed the marginal costs of making additional reductions? A tax that
lacks these features creates insufficient incentives to reduce emissions below
current levels.229
Neoclassical economic theory supports setting tax rates equal to the
"social costs" of the pollution." If a government calculation of the social
costs of pollution leads to a tax less than the marginal cost of control, how-
ever, the tax will not provide an adequate economic incentive to reduce
emissions." Hence, a system designed to use economic incentives to im-
prove environmental quality must establish tax rates exceeding the marginal
cost of reductions. The theory that tax rates should equal social costs assumes
that environmental quality should not improve when costs of further improve-
ments outweigh the monetary value a government body affixes to avoiding
harms the pollution causes, usually mislabeled as "benefits. 111
2
This problem of criteria for determining the amount of a tax, however,
flags a more general problem with taxes: some governmental body must
establish the tax rate. In theory, the government can calibrate taxes to meet
73-78 (1974) (describing how tax results in optimum levels of pollution); Breyer, supra note
78, at 596-97 (discussing benefits of environmental tax regime); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CENTER, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES INNEW ENGLAND: AN INVENTORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAX AND FEE MECHANISMs ENACTED BY THENEW ENGLAND STATES AND
NEW YORK 1 (1996); cf. Joe Loper, Evaluating Existing State and Local Tax Codes from an
"Environmental Tax" Perspective: The Case ofEnergy-Related Taxes, 12 PACEENVTL.L.REV.
61, 64-65 (1994) (evaluating why tax on energy is not environmental tax unless it is higher than
taxes on other goods).
227. For a detailed discussion of tax design considerations, see Amy C. Christian, Design-
ing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of the Carbon-Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 221 (1992).
228. Marginal costs may vary depending on the amount of pollution reduction desired.
Hence, one must design the tax to exceed the marginal cost of making the quantity of reduction
desired.
229. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 7 ("A firm will control up to the point where the
marginal cost of control just equals the fee.").
230. See BAXTER, supra note 226, at 73-78 (recommending that tax rates equal pollution
damages).
231. In addition, directing an agency to set a fee equal to social costs probably will not
succeed as a practical matter. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 567-601 (discussing difficulty of
determining environmental costs); Stewart, supra note 30, at 1328.
232. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 560-63; cf. Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 163 (stating




any given goal precisely, but a scarcity of accurate information about control
costs and environmental effects makes doing so in practice difficult. 3
Because a political process fixes the tax rate, taxes do not provide the
escape from government decisions inspired by the free market vision. Deci-
sions about tax rates may cause disputes. 4 If the decision-making process
involves predicting the quantity of pollution reduction a given tax will stimu-
late, the government must gather the same kind of information used for
technology-based decision making. The government must predictwhetherthe
tax will exceed marginal control costs at facilities in order to determine
whether the tax will reduce emissions."5 The government must anticipate
what techniques might be employed to reduce emissions in order to estimate
the marginal control costs. z6 If the governments wishes to establish tax rates
equal to "social costs," then the government must engage in an even more
difficult information gathering and analytical effort." Hence, delegating
authority to fix tax rates to EPA or a similar state agency might lead to delay
and uncertainty similar to that experienced under traditional regulation. 8
To the extent legislative bodies set rates, a less constrained process,
similar to that governing legislatively set emission limitations, may apply.
233. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 8; see also Dennis, supra note 133, at 1110
(stating that value of environment relative to private goods cannot be established because it is
public good).
234. A proponent of pollution taxes can count on opposition from the polluters that may
have to pay the new tax. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 5, at 8 n.31 (quoting James M. Buchanan
& Gordon Tullock, Polluters'Profits andPoliticalResponse: Direct Control Versus Taxes, 65
AM. ECON.REV. 139, 141-42(1975)). This makes pollution taxes politically difficultto create,
as President Clinton discovered when he proposed taxing British Thermal Units of Energy early
in his first term. See Keohane et al., supra note 42, at 20-2 1. Polluters lobbied vigorously and
successfully to defeat his very modest proposal. See Dawn Erlandson, The BTU Tax Experi-
ence: What Happened and Why it Happened, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 173, 179-84 (1994).
Some groups may benefit from reduced taxes when environmental taxes are introduced, if
pollution taxes displace existing taxes. The recipients of tax relief may become supporters of
a pollution taxes. See Frank Muller & J. Andrew Hoerner, Greening State Energy Taxes:
Carbon Taxes for Revenue and the Environment, 12 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 5, 16 (1994)
(discussing tax shifting strategy).
235. Baumol and Oates discuss a procedure that involves no estimation of control costs.
This approach sets a pollution reduction target and then revises tax levels until the target is
achieved. BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 162-63. An agency obeying a legal mandate
to use taxes to reach a reduction target, however, would have to have a non-arbitrary basis for
concluding the tax might meet the target. Therefore, it would have to estimate control costs.
236. See ANDERSONETAL., supra note 155, at 15.
237. See id at7 ("[A]s apractical matter total social damages are almostimpossibleto com-
pute."); Driesen, supra note 21, at 558, 594-604; Naughton, supra note 162, at 201-02.
238. See generally BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 160 (describing problems caused
by the necessity for information).
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Limits on legislative time, however, may constrain use of a legislative ap-
proach, and the legislators still might need similar information.
Because calibrating a tax to meet pollution reduction goals may prove
difficult in practice, government bodies may have to revise tax rates repeat-
edly in order to meet public goals. 39 However, frequent revision may create
uncertainties; comparable to the uncertainties traditional regulation creates,
that weaken a taxation's ability to stimulate innovation. If plant operators
cannot count on tax rates remaining constant or becoming stricter in a predict-
able fashion, they may lobby to weaken the tax system instead of implement-
ing reductions in response to the incentive.24
Tax rates may change in response to ideology, perceived fiscal impera-
tives, and pressure exerted by taxpayers."4 In contrast, a tax may become
entrenched and therefore stable.2 Stability may prove advantageous in terms
of providing incentives for innovation, but may delay appropriate response to
changing conditions and knowledge about environmental effects.4 3
A tax, unlike emissions trading, may offer a continuous incentive for
environmental improvement. The operator can always reduce the tax by
making additional innovations until the taxed pollution reaches the zero level,
at least in theory.2" A significant tax may be necessary to secure management
work on developing and implementing innovation.245 But the tax may provide
an adequate incentive to implement further control anytime an innovation
shifts the marginal cost of control to a level less than that of the tax. 6
239. See id. at 178; Howard Gensler, The Economics of Pollution Taxes, 10 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 10-12 (1995).
240. See MIKAEL SKOUANDERSEN, GOVERNANCEBY GREEN TAXEs:MAKING POLLUTION
PREVENTION PAY 27 (1994).
241. See Thomas J. Purcell, III, An Analysis of the Formation of Federal Income Tax
Policy, 18 CREIGHTON L. REv. 653, 653-61 (1985).
242. Kerr, supra note 101, at 7 ("Taxes are notoriously difficult to alter .....
243. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 193-94 (discussing advantages and disad-
vantages of direct controls).
244. See Stewart, supra note 85, at 11 (discussing value incentives).
245. See Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 107 (1989) (noting that most
charges actually in effect are not large enough to affect greatly polluter's behavior).
246. See Richard McHugh, The Potential for Private Cost-Increasing Technological
Innovation Under a Tax-Based, Economic Incentive Pollution Control Policy, 61 LAND ECON.
58, 59 (1985) (discussing nature of cost-increasing technological innovation); cf ANDERSEN,
supra note 240, at 28-29 (noting that successful Japanese sulfur dioxide taxes led to widespread
scrubbing, not cleaner technology and that some firms have not responded to tax incentives as
economists predict).
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If the government adopts pollution taxes, it must enhance monitoring of
emissions and enforcement activities.247 Otherwise, it may allow taxable
pollution to remain untaxed.248 Hence, an enforcement difficulty remains.
In sum, taxes may provide a greater incentive for continuous innovation
than traditional regulations or emissions trading. They do not require govern-
ments to set emission levels. Like emissions trading and traditional regula-
tion, they rely upon difficult government decision making as the stimulant for
emission reductions.249
B. Making Economic Incentive Programs More Dynamic
Through Environmental Competition
Pollution taxes may create continuous economic incentives to reduce
emissions, but they do not rely on the dynamic that drives a competitive free
market - competition among firms." Rather, the incentive comes from the
same source as incentives in traditional regulation, government decisions.
We can design more dynamic economic incentives that encourage
competition to reduce pollution, much as the free market creates competition
to provide better amenities. This requires creation of mechanisms that cir-
cumvent the need for repeated government decisions and allow private ac-
tions, rather than government decisions, to stimulate reductions in pollution.
The law can apply either positive economic incentives, such as revenue
increases or cost decreases, or negative economic incentives, such as revenue
decreases or cost increases, to polluters. This reveals a possibility that has
received too little attention."' Negative economic incentives can fund posi-
tive economic incentives.
Governments have designed programs that use negative economic
incentives to fund positive economic incentives. New Zealand addressed the
247. Accord Stewart, supra note 85, at 11 (discussing monitoring of emissions).
248. See Kerr, supra note 101, at 64.
249. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 178-79 (citing study in which tax programs
would increase costs to polluters by factor of six over equally effective control regime).
250. See Stewart, supra note 85, at 11 (noting emissions incentives). Firms can seize an
advantage over competing firms under a pollution tax by innovating to escape or reduce the tax.
Id The amount of the tax limits the potential competitive advantage. Spending more than the
marginal tax rate to control pollution offers no competitive advantage. Thus, this does not
mirror free market dynamics, where the magnitude of advantages to be seized through innova-
tion has few theoretical limits.
251. This possibility has received some attention. See Hahn, supra note 245, at 104-07
(describing effluent taxes dedicated to funding environmental improvement); Stewart, supra
note 85, at 12 n.31 (noting that fees from pollution tax could be used to subsidize pollution
reduction).
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depletion of its fishery by imposing fees on fishing, a negative economic
incentive, and using revenue from these fees to pay some fishermen to retire,
a positive economic incentive. 2 This may reduce pressure on the fish if fees
are high enough. 3 The California legislature has considered a program,
Drive +, that imposes a fee upon consumers purchasing an energy inefficient
or high pollution vehicle. 4 The proceeds fund a rebate on the purchase of an
energy efficient vehicle or low polluting vehicle. 5 Similarly, New Hampshire
officials have proposed an "Industry Average Performance System" that
redistributes pollution taxes to the polluting industry in ways that favor lower
emissionsY6
One can build on this principle to craft laws that mimic the free market's
dynamic competitive character far better than taxes or subsidies. In a compet-
itive free market, a firm that innovates to reduce its cost or increase its reve-
nues not only increases its profits, it often reduces its competitors' profits.
Hence, firms in a very competitive market face strong incentives to innovate
and improve. 7 Failing to innovate and improve can threaten their survival.
Implementing innovations and improvements can help firms prosper in a
competitive market.
One could craft an "environmental competition law" requiring polluters
to pay any costs that competitors incur in reducing pollution plus a substantial
premium, thereby creating a significant incentive to be among the first to
reduce pollution." An environmental competition law directly attacks a
fundamental problem with existing free market incentives: the polluting firm
must absorb any clean-up costs. Because the firm does not experience all of
252. T.H. Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environment, CHAL-
LENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 42, 43.
253. Id. at 42-43.
254. See Nathanael Greene & Vanessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives
for Cleaner, More Efficient Vehicles, 12 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 91, 94-97 (1994) (describing
DRIVE+).
255. Id. at 94-95.
256. See JEFFREY C. MACGILLIVRAY & KENNETH COLBURN, A NEW APPROACH TO AIR
POLLUTION REGULATION, INDUSTRY-AVERAGE PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS (LAPS) 20 (1997) (on
file with author).
257. See TORNATZKY&FLEISCHER, supra note 30, at 168 (noting that intense competition
tends to stimulate spread of innovation).
258. The government might still have to decide which pollutants to target. Like other
economic incentive schemes, this one would require developing sufficient data to determine the
relative pollution levels of facilities. The law would work best if it included some mechanism,
such as a requirement that pollution levels be posted regularly on the internet, that made it
possible to see whether a company environmentally has performed better than competitors,
without having to obtain information from government files. Implementing legislation would
also have to determine a common metric for determining relative reductions.
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the costs of pollution itself (most are externalized and felt by the general
public) it rarely pays to clean-up. 9 If firms could systematically externalize
the costs of clean-up without substantial administrative intervention, just as
they externalize the cost of pollution, then even a fairly modest premium
might create adequate incentives to control pollution.
An environmental competition statutewould create aprivate environmen-
tal law, with a few public decisions setting up the law but with substantial
enforcement by low polluting businesses against competitors. The law would
create a private right of action that allowed a business that realized environ-
mental improvements through investment in pollution reducing (or low
pollution) processes, control devices, products, or services to secure reim-
bursement for expenses, plus some premium, from more polluting competi-
tors.2" Hence, the scheme would create economic incentives for some compa-
259. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 155, at 3-4 (describing this principle). For an
application of this principle to international environmental law, see David M. Driesen, The
Congressional Role In International Environmental Law and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFr. L. REv. 287, 306 (1991).
260. The definition of a competitor from whom an environmentally exceptional company
might claim a payment would play an important role in such a statute. EPA traditionally
regulates by grouping industrial processes that share standard industrial classification (SIC)
codes and then creating subgroupings to try and address plants with similar environmental or
physical characteristics. See OFFICEOFMANAGEMENTANDBUDGETEXEcuTIvEOFFICEOFTHE
PRESIDENT, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL (1987) (explaining SIC codes);
see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System ofEnvironmental Regulation: The Case for
an Industry SectorApproach, 26 ENVTL: L. 457, 473-74 (1996). This makes sense for regula-
tion.
However, SIC codes do not fully describe competitors in a system designed to reward
environmentally friendly innovation and apply a negative economic incentive to dirtier means
of meeting the same consumer goal. Ideally, somebody who develops a system of integrated
pest management (IPM), for example, that makes it possible to increase beet yield with little or
no pesticides, should be able to collect a payment from pesticide manufacturers that compete
with her to maximize beet yield. See Elizabeth B. Baldwin, Note, Reclaiming Our Future:
International Efforts to Eliminate the Threat of Persistent Organic Pollutants, 20 HASTINGS
INT'L & COM. L. REv. 855, 891 (1997) (explaining IPM). Even if the IPM developer operates
a research farm and the pesticide manufacturer operates a pesticide plant, the statute should
regard them as competitors (or allow courts to develop a common law of competition based on
broad principles).
Application of an environmental competition statute to awell-defined group of polluters
with very clear definitions tailored to one problem would probably not generate large volumes
of disputes (but also would produce less widespread environmental improvement). For
example, one could require all electric utilities to pay fees for each ton of nitrogen oxide
emissions and divide the proceeds evenly among the five electric utilities with the lowest rate
of nitrogen oxide emissions at the end of the year 2000. This would be rather simple to
administer. Broader programs would pose more competitor definition issues, but would offer
even broader incentives for innovation and environmental improvement.
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nies to become enforcers of the law, rather than creating incentives for all
companies to resist enforcement.261
Such a proposal overcomes the fundamental problem with traditional
emissions trading and taxes. Those mechanisms rely on government decisions
as the driver for pollution reductions. An environmental competition law
makes private initiative, motivated by the prospect of gain and the fear of loss,
the driver of environmental improvement, thus replicating free market dynam-
ics. 62 The magnitude of the incentive may depend upon the extent of industry
fears about competitors' achievements, rather than only the fixed cost directly
imposed by government.263
261. Such a law should have adispute resolution mechanism. Competitor enforcement may
produce more need for conflict resolution. An environmental competition law may create
commercial disputes resembling those that arise under other commercial laws. Disputes may
arise about defining what is a competitor, what costs a company incurred, and what reductions
in pollution actually occurred. One may want to use some fees from polluters to finance
specialized arbitration of these disputes.
An environmental competition statute should not generate complicated environmentally
fruitless disputes. The Superfund law makes a variety of parties associated with toxic waste
dumps strictly jointly and severally liable for clean-up. Representatives of companies facing
Superfund liability often complain that this has led to protracted disputes largely because
apportioning liability among potentially responsible parties (PRPs) has proven difficult. See
Rena I. Steinzor & Linda E. Greer, In Defense ofthe SuperfundLiability System: Matching the
Diagnosis and the Cure, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,286, 10,290 n.19 (June 1997)
(citing KATHERINEN. PROBSTETAL., FOOTINGTHEBILLFOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS, WHOPAYS
AND How? 26 (1995)) (describing such complaints).
The principle causes of protracted disputes under Superfund would not exist under an
environmental competition statute. Allocating responsibility has proven difficult under super-
fund because good information about the past history of toxic waste dumps (who dumped, who
allowed dumping etc.) is hard to come by and the program creates great uncertainty about the
means and scope of eventual clean-up. It usually will not be difficult to determine who caused
a reduction under an environmental competition statute, since liability will only arise after a
pollution reducing activity is completed and documented.
PRPs and EPA often seek to allocate responsibility under Superfund before completion
of clean-up. See, e.g., Allen Samelson, "Whose Liability is ThisAnyway?" The Allowability of
Environmental Clean-Up Costs PotentiallyAttributable to Other Responsible Parties, 24 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 293,308-09(1995). This also hinders settlement because the total value of liability
remains open-ended at the time of negotiation. An environmental competition statute should
only allow claims based on already completed clean-up.
262. An environmental competition law might seem to create incentives to reduce first and
do nothing to motivate reductions from slow movers. The dynamic such a program creates, like
the dynamic of a free market, works more broadly than suggested above. Nobody would know,
a priori, who the first movers would be. Thus, anybody who did not actively seek emission
reductions would risk financial loss of uncertain dimension, precisely the risk companies face
when they fail to innovate in making improvements or new products in a competitive market.
263. See TORNATZKY& FLEISCHER, supra note 30, at 86 (describing how firm research and
development expenditures tend to respond to competitive pressures).
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Moreover, such a scheme provides a continuous incentive to reduce
pollution. Any company can profitby making an environmental improvement
or lose money by failing to make one.2 The government does need to
establish the premium to be paid first movers. But once it established this,
repeated government decisions are not necessary. Securing maximum incen-
tives for innovation may require legal structures that induce competition to
produce environmental improvement and lessen the need for repeated govern-
ment decisions.
C. TheoreticalAdvantages and Disadvantages of True
Economic Incentives
True economic incentive programs offer some advantages over traditional
regulation, ifthey meet the requisites described above. They provide continu-
ous incentives to reduce pollution, often through innovative means. They
provide incentives to perform better than regulations require. They will tend
to produce better results per dollar of industry expenditure than traditional
regulation because companies with the cheapest reduction alternatives will
probably reduce pollution the most in response to economic incentives. 265
True economic incentives also provide the possibility of achieving a lot with
fewer difficult administrative decisions mandating emission reductions.
But one must move beyond even taxes to develop systems that do not
depend, to a significant degree, upon difficult governmental decisions.
Indeed, if we want to maximize free market-like innovation, we may wish to
find strategies that stimulate competition to reduce pollution.
264. Companies might conclude that they would rather collude to avoid such a scheme
than compete to earn money from it. All of the companies subject to the law could defeat it by
deciding to do nothing. To prevent this collusion, lawmakers might restrict communication
between companies regarding their plans under the law. Communication about reduction plans
might be considered a combination in restraint of environmental trade and banned on a kind of
antitrust theory. Laws drafted to make it possible for many companies to compete for pollution
reduction reimbursement should also limit opportunities for collusion. See Hospital Corp. of
Am. v. Federal Trade Comm., 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The fewer competitors
there are in a market, the easier it is for them to coordinate their pricing.... ."); DOUGLAS G.
BAiRDETAL., GAMETHEORYANDTHBLAW 175 (1994) ("As the number offirms in an industry
increases, collusion becomes less likely."); Dean M. Harris, State Action Immunity From
Antitrust Law for Public Hospitals: The Hidden Time Bomb for Health Care Reform, 44 U.
KAN. L. REV. 459, 468 (1996) ("[A] reduction in the number of providers in the market
increases the likelihood of collusion among the remaining firms...."); Paul A. Jorissen, Anti-
trust Challenges to Nonprofit Hospital Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 21 Loy.
U. Cm. L.J. 1231, 1235 (1990) ("[A] basic premise underlying economic analysis is that collu-
sion becomes more likely when the number offirms competing in the market decreases."). See
generallyEDwiNMANSFIELD,MICROECNONMICS: THEORYANDAPPLICATIONS351 (8th ed. 1994).
265. See Kerr, supra note 101, at 64-65. Emissions trading shares this virtue.
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On the other hand, true economic incentive programs do not involve the
same degree of political control of pollution levels as traditional environmen-
tal regulation and emissions trading. True economic incentive programs
obtain the level of pollution reduction that private actors choose to offer in
response to the incentive. While government can exercise some control over
the intensity of the incentive - especially in the tax context - one does not
know apriori exactly what the incentive will produce.2"
This lack of political control poses significant issues. Environmental
statutes generally demand the amount of reductions needed to meet some
public goal.267 It may seem troubling to have pollution control schemes that
do not purport to mandate the amount of reductions needed to meet a publicly
chosen goal.
On the other hand, current environmental statutes, while sometimes
producing substantial progress, often fail to realize their goals.6" Statutes
aimed at meeting public health goals often produce long debates about the
right amount of emission reductions needed to protect public health, often in
lieu of some of the concrete actions that improve public health.269 Cost-
benefit statutes tend to produce a failure to make decisions instead of cost-
benefit balanced regulation.27 So, a law that induced significant pollution
reductions, but did not require calculation of environmental and public health
benefits, might offer significant advantages.27
266. See generally Hanley et al., supra note 94, at 1424-25 (discussing difficulties in
setting rates for effluent charges).
267. For example, many statutes aim to protect human health and the environment. See,
e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (stating that goal of
Occupation Safety and Health Act is to advance worker health whenever feasible); Union
Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976) (finding that purpose of Clean Air Act is to attain
national air quality standards protecting health and environment); Public Citizen v. Young, 831
F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (primary goal of Food Drug and Cosmetic Act is "human
safety"). Neoclassical economists tend to favor a goal of "optimal" pollution and assume that
this requires that regulation balances costs and benefits. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 583.
Elsewhere, this author has challenged the assumption that cost-benefit balanced regulations
produce optimal pollution levels. Id. at 581-600.
268. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 555 (noting progress but also noting failure to realize
some goals).
269. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103,145-48 (1996); Latin, supra note 59, at 1308-09; Wendy
E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic RiskRegulation, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1613,1677-81
(1995).
270. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 601-05 (noting this problem).
271. Moreover, legislative debates about pollution tax rates and their analogues may take
public health protection and economic goals into account at least roughly. Thus, true economic
incentive programs may have goals but may lack the expectation that administrative agencies
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This lack of political control may threaten public participation in emis-
sion reduction decisions. Because private parties will make reduction deci-
sions in programs based on true economic incentives, the public may lack
opportunities to participate. The opportunity to participate in decisions about
rate-setting may partially make up for this. In an environmental competition
statute, government would decide which pollutants to address a priori and
assess whether reductions achieved are satisfactory ex-post, when unusually
good information might be available, providing opportunities for public partic-
ipation. Public participation in directly providing reductions remains a
problem.
Because true economic incentive programs, unlike emissions trading,
may tend to supplement rather than supplant regulatory programs, this public
participation problem will not defeat democratic control of emission levels.
If the public can participate in decisions mandating reductions in the regula-
tory context, then the objection that the public lacks such an opportunity in a
true economic incentive context seems less serious. One can also build
opportunities for public participation into any administrative and adjudicatory
processes associated with true economic incentive programs.
V Conclusion
The conventional dichotomy between command and control regulation
and economic incentives may have served a useful purpose in stimulating
experiments with emissions trading. Realizing improvement will require a
more nuanced approach.
The dichotomy tends to ignore the advantages and exaggerate the disad-
vantages of traditional regulation. Since even strong critics of traditional reg-
ulation recoguize that traditional regulation may need to address pollutants
that emissions trading cannot regulate effectively (such as pollution that
cannot be properly monitored and pollution with important localized effects),
we should refrain from undermining traditional regulation with the inaccurate
"command and control" label, even as we seek to overcome its limitations.
Scholars and governmental officials should employ the neutral term employed
in this article, "traditional regulation."
The dichotomy hinders efforts to apply the lessons of almost two decades
of experience with emissions trading. Emissions trading will work poorly if
will precisely calibrate regulations to meet them. See Stewart, Risks, supra note 5, at 159
(noting that in pollution tax system level of charge would be setto achieve environmental goals,
but there is some uncertainty in responses by firms to such charges). Because we know that
agencies cannot precisely calibrate regulations anyway, because the information about costs and
environmental and health effects is inaccurate and incomplete respectively, this may not be a
terrible loss. See Driesen, supra note 21, at 594, 600-01.
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regulators adopt market expansion or displacement of command and control
regulation as an objective, rather than full realization of planned reductions
at lower cost.
One must ask whether the activities an economic inducement encourages
coincide with public policy goals, taking into account potential strategic
behavior. Similarly, one must consider the source of economic inducements
in proposed schemes and take into account the precise nature of the govern-
ment's role in proposals. This approach may help create a wise mixture of
approaches tailored to specific problems.
If we wish to stimulate increased innovation and continuous improve-
ment, we may need less government investment in emissions trading and more
experimentation with true economic incentive programs. Programs designed
to emulate the free market's competitive dynamics and properly designed
pollution taxes may create economic incentives to continually innovate and
improve.
